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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Plaintiffs are natural persons. As such, a corporate disclosure statement is
not required. Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(a).
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REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE HEARD
This case presents important questions of law, essentially of first impression
in this circuit, concerning whether the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230, precludes a child sex trafficking victim from suing a website operator based
on allegations that the operator has engaged in an intentional course of conduct that
violates state and federal criminal laws prohibiting the sexual exploitation of
children. Last month, in a case also involving these Defendants, the Washington
Supreme Court addressed some of these same questions, resolving them in the
exact opposite direction as the District Court did below. Plaintiffs respectfully
submit that oral argument will aid the Court in its resolution of the questions of law
that this appeal presents.

1
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The District Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a), and their pendant state claims under
both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1367. The District Court entered a final judgment
disposing of all of Plaintiffs’ claims on May 15, 2015. Add.35.1 Plaintiffs filed
their timely notice of appeal on June 15, 2015.

App.261.

This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

1

Throughout this brief, “Add.” refers to the attached Addendum and “App.” refers
to the Appendix filed herewith.
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ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Plaintiffs’ sex trafficking and unfair and deceptive business

practices claims involving affirmative unlawful conduct, as pled, “treat” Backpage
as the mere “publisher or speaker” of unlawful advertisements created by
“another” and thus implicate the federal Communications Decency Act’s “Good
Samaritan” provision, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
2.

Whether Plaintiffs’ claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection

Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), a federal criminal statute that includes a
private right of action, constitutes the “enforcement of” federal criminal law and,
therefore, is expressly excepted from the Communications Decency Act’s “Good
Samaritan” provision, see 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).
3.

Whether the District Court erred in concluding, on a motion to dismiss,

that Plaintiffs’ claim under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A did not
sufficiently allege causation, where the complaint alleges in detail that Plaintiffs
were injured by Backpage’s concerted, intentional misrepresentations and the
resulting growth in both the total online sex trafficking market and Backpage’s
share of that market.
4.

Whether the District Court erred in dismissing on the pleadings

Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims based on a determination that they allege
merely incidental use of Plaintiffs’ photographs, even though the claims arise from

3
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Backpage’s nonconsensual use of exploitative photographs of Plaintiffs for
advertising and trade purposes in order to enhance the allure and, therefore, the
profitability to Backpage of the classified advertisements that unlawfully held
Plaintiffs out for sale.
5.

Whether the District Court erred in dismissing on the pleadings

Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 3’s copyright claim without addressing the merits and
without considering (i) her request for the remedy of injunctive relief, or (ii)
whether a fully developed factual record could support an award of actual damages.

4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are three girls who suffered severe physical and psychological
injuries as a result of being trafficked for sex, while minors and against their wills,
on the sex trade “classified advertisement” website Backpage.com. Defendants
(hereinafter “Backpage”) are the owners and operators of Backpage.com.
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”) alleged that, in
violation of federal and state laws, Backpage engaged in a systematic, clandestine,
and purposeful course of conduct to encourage, profit from, and shield from
scrutiny the unlawful advertisements that offered Plaintiffs for sale for sex. The
Complaint also alleges that Backpage violated Plaintiffs’ intellectual property
rights by using their pictures without their consent.

Without questioning the

plausibility of the principal allegations, the District Court (Stearns, J.) nevertheless
dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice in its entirety.
A.

Factual Background
1.

Introduction.

Backpage.com is a sophisticated online marketplace for illegal commercial
sex. Each day, across the country, many thousands of advertisements are posted in
the “Escorts” section of Backpage.com. Almost all of these advertisements are for
illegal sex. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, No. 15 C 063460, 2015 WL 5174008,
at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2015) (finding that, at the very least, “a substantial
majority of [Backpage’s escort] ads are ‘exhortations to illegal conduct,’” id. at
5
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*12 n.11, and “are connected to human trafficking,” id. at *12). A substantial
portion

of

these

advertisements,

moreover,

involve

children,

including

advertisements of the Plaintiffs in this case, who were sold for sex on
Backpage.com beginning at age 15.

The exploitation of children through

Backpage.com results from a business model that generates enormous profits from
knowingly participating with and aiding traffickers in the sexual exploitation of
children. Backpage has sustained this business model through a series of actions
set forth in the Complaint that have protected the anonymity of traffickers
advertising on the website, enhanced the utility of the website as the most
advantageous option for traffickers, and expanded the market for advertisements
for illegal sex with children and others while deceiving law enforcement and
nonprofit organizations.
2.

The Emergence of Backpage.com as the Dominant Player in the
Online Commercial Sex Trade.

Backpage.com takes its name from the infamous “Back Page” of the Village
Voice newspaper, whose back pages were known to contain classified
advertisements for commercial sex.

Indeed, until 2012, Defendant Camarillo

Holdings LLC (then known as Village Voice Media) owned the Village Voice.
Over the past decade or more, marketing for prostitution services has migrated to
the Internet, with Backpage.com now accounting for 80 percent or more of online
commercial sex advertising in the United States, involving thousands of
6
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advertisements daily in each of 394 geographic areas. Moreover, it is estimated
that tens of thousands of children are trafficked for sex annually in the United
States, mostly through the Internet. Of these exploited children, the vast majority
are advertised on Backpage.com. App.22-23.
3.

The Market Share Growth Scheme.

The dominance of Backpage in the online sex trade is a relatively recent
development. In 2010, in part due to concerns regarding child exploitation on its
website, Craigslist (which had been the market leader in illegal online commercial
sex advertising) voluntarily shut down its Adult Services category. To capitalize
on this development, Backpage initiated a scheme to minimize public scrutiny of
its business, particularly the exploitation of children, while it undertook to expand
its market share to become the dominant presence in the commercial sex
trafficking business. App.18, 24.
In furtherance of this scheme, Backpage undertook to forge seemingly
cooperative relationships with law enforcement agencies and nonprofits, such as
the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (“NCMEC”), the leading
organization in the country working with law enforcement, families, and the
professionals who serve them on issues related to missing and sexually exploited

7

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116894746

children. 2

Page: 18

Date Filed: 09/28/2015

Entry ID: 5940947

Backpage provided assurances to these organizations that it was

dedicated to being the “sheriff” of the Internet, devoted to defeating the “scourge”
of online child sex trafficking. Specifically, Backpage promised to be vigilant in
attempting to detect sex trafficking of minors, to increase reporting of suspicious
advertisements, to develop and adopt analytical techniques to detect advertising of
children, and to be a model of cooperation with law enforcement. With these
representations, Backpage induced NCMEC and others to make public statements
supportive of Backpage during the critical period following the closure of
Craigslist’s Adult Services category. App.25-26.
Contrary to these representations, Backpage intended only to engage in
superficial efforts to work with these agencies, and only to the extent necessary to
divert their attention from its growing market share and business success.
Backpage has not adopted known techniques or technologies to detect child sex
trafficking, nor adopted other best practices discussed with NCMEC and others,
and it has selectively reported advertisements that Backpage knew were unlikely to
involve child sex trafficking victims. App.19, 26-29. Its reporting was unfair and
deceptive in other ways as well. For example, if Backpage receives an external
report that an advertisement in a particular city involves a child, Backpage will

2

See About Us, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
http://www.missingkids.com/About (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
8
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consider removing the advertisement in that city and reporting the advertisement to
NCMEC.

However, Backpage takes no steps to remove or report other

advertisements for the same child, including even identical advertisements that are
posted in other geographical regions; nor do they identify or report other
advertisements involving the same phone number, web address, or other
identifying information indicative of trafficking of children. App.26-28. Indeed,
Backpage does not even consistently remove advertisements when parents report
their minor children are pictured in the advertisements. This happened to Plaintiff
Jane Doe No. 3 when her parents asked that Backpage remove her photograph
from Backpage.com. See infra p.16.
While it eventually became clear that the various representations by
Backpage were simply a diversion to enable Backpage to solidify its market
position, the damage had been done. Because Backpage protected the ability of
traffickers to advertise children for sex, and thus enhanced its reputation among
traffickers as a “safe” and favorable place to advertise sex trafficking victims, it
became the dominant player in the online commercial sex trade. The evolving
success of Backpage directly contributed to a significant growth in demand for
online illegal commercial sex, resulting in a substantial increase in the number of
advertisements on Backpage.com and a corresponding increase in the number of
children exploited through the website. App.29.

9
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The Business Model Supporting the Success of Backpage.

Backpage designed its website to maximize the perception among traffickers
that Backpage.com is the most advantageous venue for the online advertising of
illegal commercial sex.

Backpage.com includes an advertisement category

conspicuously labeled “Adult Entertainment,” which includes a number of
subcategories, one of which is “Escorts.”

Backpage knows that customers

understand that the “Escorts” subcategory is where they will find offers of sex in
exchange for money.

Backpage monitors this category and removes

advertisements from the website that would undermine its effectiveness as a
marketplace for traffickers, including advertisements by law enforcement running
“sting” operations and by victim-protection organizations. App.29-32.
Backpage understands that the success of its business model depends on the
perceived advantages the website presents to traffickers seeking to avoid detection
by law enforcement. Thus, Backpage actively assists traffickers by various means
to avoid detection and complete illegal transactions, including:
(i)

Backpage does not require advertisers in its “Escorts” section to

provide any identifying information about the person placing the
advertisement (the “poster”) or the subject of the advertisement. Backpage

10
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also allows users to pay for advertisements using prepaid credit cards, 3
making these transactions difficult to track in the absence of a name, address,
or any other identifying information. Moreover, Backpage now accepts
Bitcoin as payment. Bitcoin is a digital currency that is likewise difficult to
track because transactions are completed without a bank. App.35.
(ii)

Backpage does not require those posting in the “Escorts”

section to include a phone number.

If a phone number is included,

Backpage allows the use of obscured forms that include letters and numbers
rather than strictly numeric characters (e.g., “twoO13fourFive678niNe”
rather than “201-345-6789”).

In contrast, Backpage does require a

numerical phone number from posters in the Pets section.

The use of

obscured phone numbers is well understood as a signal to prospective
customers that the individual in the advertisement is being sold for sex.
App.36.
(iii)

Backpage does not require posters in the “Escorts” section to

verify their email addresses. Backpage offers to “hide” the advertiser’s
email address and then offers a menu of options to the advertiser to privately
3

In recognition of the widespread illegality on Backpage.com, the major credit
card companies (American Express, Visa, and Mastercard) recently terminated
access by Backpage to their payment services. In the aftermath of the terminations,
Backpage has made some changes to its approach. See Dart, 2015 WL 5174008,
at *4-5, *11.
11
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facilitate and manage communications with the customer responding to the
advertisement and seeking to purchase sex. App.36-37.
(iv)

Backpage also makes it difficult to track photographs that

accompany advertisements. When uploaded, photographs are embedded
with “metadata,” which is identifying information that typically reflects the
date, time, geolocation, and other critical information about the photograph.
Backpage deliberately adjusted its server software to delete the metadata on
each uploaded photo to impede law enforcement from tracking the
photograph or determining whether photographs with the same metadata are
posted elsewhere on Backpage.com. App.37-38
In addition to assisting traffickers to avoid detection and complete
transactions, Backpage makes no effort to block advertisements that exhibit signs
that a child is being trafficked for sex, and indeed even takes some steps to “coach”
advertisers on how to submit an advertisement for a child sex trafficking victim.
For example, it is well known that traffickers often require an exploited child to
post the advertisement on Backpage.com, but Backpage does not require age
verification to post in the “Escorts” section. While a poster must enter his or her
age before posting, if the poster enters an age under 18, he or she receives a
message that reads: “Oops! Sorry, the ad poster must be over 18 years of age.”
Instead of blocking the poster, Backpage offers the opportunity to simply enter a
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different age. No matter how many times the poster has entered an age under 18,
the poster has the option to enter an age above 18, but to otherwise use the same
information entered previously for the rest of the advertisement. App.35-36.
Likewise, if a poster attempts to include any non-permitted terms in an
advertisement—such as “teenage” or “schoolgirl”—he or she receives this message:
“Oops!

The term ‘___’ is forbidden in this category.”

Backpage does not,

however, block the poster, no matter what the import of the non-permitted term or
how many times the poster has attempted to use it. Rather, Backpage allows the
poster to delete or alter the offending term and once again elect to “Continue.”
Backpage also allows an advertiser to include synonyms and misspellings of nonpermitted terms that indicate an underage victim, such as “brly legal.”

This

process encourages traffickers to advertise sexual services and exploit child
trafficking victims without including the terms most likely to garner attention from
law enforcement. App.39-41.
The “Escorts” subcategory has been extremely lucrative for Backpage.
While advertisers of goods or services unrelated to adult services are permitted to
post advertisements without charge, Backpage charges a fee in its “Adult
Entertainment” category. As of the date of the Complaint, the charge to place an
advertisement in the “Escorts” section was $12.00 in most geographic areas,
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including Boston and the surrounding metropolitan region, though Backpage
charged up to $17.00 per advertisement in parts of New York City. App.33.
5.

The Trafficking of Plaintiffs Through Backpage.com.

Jane Doe No. 1 was trafficked across Massachusetts and Rhode Island
exclusively on Backpage.com, beginning when she was 15 years old. She was sold
and raped 10-12 times per day by men responding to the advertisements. Jane Doe
No. 1 estimates that she was raped over 1000 times. App.46.
At the direction of her trafficker, Jane Doe No. 1 used a pre-paid mobile
phone to post advertisements on Backpage.com, reposting the ads multiple times
each day, and providing the same pre-paid mobile phone number for customers to
contact her. The trafficker instructed her to use terminology such as “roses” to
refer to money, and to use letters and symbols in addition to numbers in her
telephone number. When Jane Doe No. 1 attempted to put her actual age into
Backpage.com she received the “Oops!” message and was then ordered by her
pimp to enter an age over 18. Jane Doe No. 1’s trafficker also required her to
simultaneously post advertisements on Backpage.com in multiple cities.

By

posting advertisements in different cities, the trafficker was able to maximize the
number of customers willing to purchase sex. The advertisements offering Jane
Doe No. 1 included photographs of parts of her body, and on at least one occasion,
the photographs included certain tattoos which were unique to her. App.47-50.
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Beginning at the age of 15, Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked across
Massachusetts on Backpage.com. During various periods from 2010 through 2012,
she was advertised an average of 6 times per day and was sold to between 5-15
customers a day, seven days a week. Jane Doe No. 2 was raped over 900 times as
a result of the advertisements placed on Backpage.com. App.50-51.
The advertisements offering Jane Doe No. 2 were posted exclusively on
Backpage.com by either the trafficker or another female with whom he worked.
One of them paid for the advertisements using stolen credit cards or pre-paid credit
cards that they purchased at convenience stores. Jane Doe No. 2 was given a prepaid mobile phone for customer calls, which began almost immediately after the
ads were posted on Backpage.com. The advertisements typically included one or
more photographs, displaying Jane Doe No. 2’s shoulders, legs, buttocks and/or
breasts. App.51-52.
Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked in Massachusetts on Backpage.com in 2013
when she was 15 years old. While at her friend’s home, Jane Doe No. 3 was
picked up by a man and a woman. At an apartment in Boston where Jane Doe No.
3 was taken, the traffickers used a pre-paid, anonymous debit card to pay for the
advertisements on Backpage.com. The headlines for the advertisements contained
words such as “new,” “sweet,” and “playful,” all known code words for minors.
After the advertisements were placed on Backpage.com, Jane Doe No. 3 started
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receiving calls and texts from men who wanted to purchase her for sex. The
traffickers drove Jane Doe No. 3 to a hotel in Foxborough, Massachusetts, where
she was raped in exchange for payment that went to her trafficker. App.52-54.
The advertisements posted on Backpage.com offering Jane Doe No. 3
included several photographs. Jane Doe No. 3 was the photographer of some of
the photographs that were displayed in the advertisements.
displayed her shoulders, legs, buttocks, and/or breasts.

The photographs

Subsequent to being

trafficked, Jane Doe No. 3 obtained a registered copyright in one of these
photographs. App.53, 61.
Shortly after Jane Doe No. 3 began being trafficked on Backpage.com, her
parents Sam and Sara Loe found advertisements for their daughter on the website
under the “Escorts” section in the Adult Entertainment category for Massachusetts.
Sam and Sara Loe twice emailed Backpage to report that a 15-year-old was being
illegally offered for sale on Backpage.com.

They provided Backpage with

information that would allow it to easily locate and remove all advertisements
involving Jane Doe No. 3 and demanded that Backpage remove the advertisements
immediately. A week later, the advertisements for Jane Doe No. 3 remained on
Backpage.com. App.53-54.
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Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed suit in the District of Massachusetts in October 2014, App.5,
asserting that Backpage had engaged in criminal conduct that triggered private
rights of action under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1591-1595, and the Massachusetts Anti-Trafficking
Act (“MATA”), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50, by means of its “participation in”
and “aid” of sex trafficking ventures. App.54-57.
The TVPRA, originally enacted in 2000 as the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, was reauthorized in 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2013. The statute
imposes severe penalties on any person who, inter alia, knowingly engages in
trafficking of a child for the purpose of causing the child to engage in “a
commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The TVPRA extends criminal liability
to those who “benefit[], financially or by receiving anything of value, from
participation in [the underlying sex trafficking] venture ....”

18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a)(2). The statute also provides victims of sex trafficking ventures with a
private right of action against any person who “knowingly benefits financially ...
from participation in [the underlying sex trafficking] venture.”

18 U.S.C.

§ 1595(a).
The MATA was enacted in 2011. Like its federal analog, the MATA not
only includes criminal penalties, but also provides victims with a private right of
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action. Under the MATA’s private right of action, a victim is entitled to sue not
only the individuals who forced her to engage in commercial sex, but also “[a]ny
business entity that knowingly aid[ed]” the venture that trafficked her “for sexual
servitude.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 50(d).
In addition to the trafficking claims, Plaintiffs made a claim under
Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A based on Backpage’s unfair and
deceptive business scheme to grow market share in the illegal sex trade. App.5759.

Plaintiffs also made claims arising from the unauthorized use of their

photographic images posted on Backpage.com. Plaintiffs each advanced a right of
publicity claim under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 214, § 3A. Jane Doe
No. 1 also alleged unauthorized use for commercial purposes of photographic
images of her in violation of Rhode Island General Laws § 9-1-28. App.59-60.
Jane Doe No. 3 alleged infringement of her rights in a registered, copyrighted
photograph in violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. App. 60-62.
Backpage moved to dismiss the Complaint, relying primarily on Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, as a defense
against Plaintiffs’ claims.

App.65.

Backpage argued that it was entitled to

immunity under Section 230(c)(1), which provides that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” Amicus curiae
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briefs were filed in support of both parties. App.69, 92, 117. On May 15, 2015,
the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice.
Add.1-35.
C.

The District Court’s Errors of Law

The District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint was erroneous as a
matter of law.
First, in dismissing Plaintiffs’ trafficking and Chapter 93A claims pursuant
to Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA, the District Court essentially ignored the
analytical framework that this Court set forth in Universal Communication Systems,
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007). Where the defendant is an
“Internet service provider,” Lycos’s framework requires a court to determine
whether the particular factual allegations on which the plaintiff’s claim is based
“treat” the defendant “as the publisher or speaker” of “information” provided by a
third party. Id. at 418; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). If the answer is no, then
Section 230(c)(1) does not bar the claim.
In the proceedings below, Plaintiffs argued that Section 230(c)(1) did not bar
their federal and state sex trafficking claims or their state unfair and deceptive
business practices claim because those claims are based on allegations that
Backpage knowingly and intentionally engaged in a highly unusual course of
affirmative conduct, including in violation of federal and state criminal law, for the
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purpose of ensuring that Backpage.com is an attractive, profitable, and hospitable
online bazaar where traffickers can sell individuals, including children, for sex.
Rather than adhere to Lycos’s analytical framework, however, the District Court
relegated to a footnote any discussion of the “treat as a publisher” element of the
statute, and that footnote failed to address either Lycos or any of Plaintiffs’
arguments. Add.17. The District Court instead focused its discussion of Section
230(c)(1) almost entirely on arguments raised by amici that Backpage should be
considered the (or at least a) creator of the unlawful commercial sex
advertisements that populate Backpage.com, Add.12-15—arguments that Plaintiffs
told the District Court they were reserving until a more complete record could be
developed. App.236.
Second, the District Court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claim
does not fall within the statutory exception in Section 230(e)(1) of the CDA
providing that “[n]othing in [the CDA] shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of ... any ... Federal criminal statute.”

Plaintiffs’ federal sex

trafficking claim falls within this exception: the TVPRA is a criminal statute
housed in Title 18 of the United States Code, and a civil action brought under the
statute’s private right of action provision is part of the statute’s overall
“enforcement” scheme. Rather than adhere to Section 230(e)(1)’s plain language,
however, the District Court erroneously concluded that the statutory phrase
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“enforcement of ... any ... Federal criminal statute” should include only criminal
prosecutions. Add.22.
Third, regarding the Chapter 93A claim, the District Court failed to address
the actual basis of the claim, which arises from Backpage’s unfair and deceptive,
and ultimately successful, scheme to grow market share to become the dominant
player in the online sex business. Backpage accomplished this scheme by making
a number of misrepresentations to key stakeholders, which, in turn, substantially
increased the incidence of child sex trafficking and the risk of harm to Plaintiffs.
The District Court held that Section 230 barred the claim because it rested on the
structure and design of Backpage.com and on Backpage’s knowledge or tacit
encouragement of illegal content—bases that, according to the court, would be
inconsistent with Section 230. Add.25-27. But Plaintiffs’ claim did not rest on
these bases at all. In addition, the District Court concluded that Plaintiffs’ theory
of causation was “too speculative to fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of
reasonably [sic] foreseeability” Add.25, without carefully considering Plaintiffs’
allegations that went to causation.
Finally, as to Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claims, the District Court
improperly assumed, contrary to the Complaint’s allegations, that Backpage did
not profit from, and only “incidentally” benefitted from, the nonconsensual
publication on Backpage.com of exploitative photographs of Plaintiffs in paid
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advertisements. Add.30. The court dismissed the claims despite allegations that
Backpage’s use of photographic images to enhance the effectiveness of
advertisements is deliberate and “an integral part of [Backpage’s] business model.”
App.59. In addition, in dismissing Jane Doe No. 3’s copyright claim, the District
Court failed to analyze the substantive merits of the claim, ignored her request for
injunctive relief despite that the Copyright Act expressly authorizes such relief,
and erroneously held that she had failed to plead any redressable damages from the
infringement of her copyright. Add.31-33.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The CDA’s “Good Samaritan” provision does not preclude Plaintiffs’

claims under the federal and state trafficking statutes and Massachusetts General
Laws Chapter 93A. The plain language of Section 230(c)(1) bars only those
claims that seek to “treat” an internet service provider (“ISP”), such as Backpage,
as the “publisher or speaker” of content that was created entirely by “another.”
Construing this provision in Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,
478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007), this Court explained that a website operator is
shielded from liability where the plaintiff’s claim seeks to “imput[e]” to the
website operator unlawful content that another party created and over which the
website operator merely exercised traditional “editorial decision[s].” Here, by
contrast, Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on allegations that, preceding the
publication of the advertisements that offered Plaintiffs for sale, Backpage engaged
in a systematic effort to encourage the rampant proliferation of illegal
advertisements for sex on Backpage.com, which included lying to law enforcement,
impeding the detection and identification of sex traffickers and the victims they
exploit, and instructing sex traffickers on how to create advertisements that would
simultaneously entice customers interested in sexually exploiting children yet
evade public scrutiny. The trafficking and Chapter 93A claims, therefore, rest on
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affirmative conduct by Backpage that places the claims comfortably outside the
boundaries of the “treat as publisher” limitation of Section 230.
2.

Even if Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claim fell under Section 230(c)—which it

does not—it should nonetheless survive dismissal under Section 230(e)(1), which
provides that the CDA shall not “be construed to impair the enforcement of ...
any ... Federal criminal statute.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1). The TVPRA is a federal
criminal statute containing a civil remedy as an integral part of its enforcement
scheme. The “enforcement” of criminal laws often includes civil actions that
support and reinforce criminal provisions of the same or related statutes, and
limiting the term “enforcement” to only government prosecutions is not faithful to
the plain language of the statute.
3.

Plaintiffs plausibly pled that Backpage’s unfair and deceptive conduct,

in violation of Chapter 93A, was both the actual and the proximate cause of
Plaintiffs’ injuries.

Backpage engaged in a systematic effort, through

misrepresentations to various agencies coupled with a concerted effort to support
traffickers, to expand the market for sex trafficking, knowing that a higher number
of children would be trafficked as a result. This scheme allowed Backpage to
dominate the online illegal sex market, which increased the risk of harm to
Plaintiffs, who then were injured in fact when they were sold repeatedly through
the marketplace created by Backpage. Such market effects are recognized as
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sufficient to show factual causation under Chapter 93A and similar statutes. In
addition, because Backpage foresaw its conduct would increase the frequency of
child sex trafficking on its website, its conduct also was the proximate cause of
Plaintiffs’ injuries.
4.

Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 214, § 3A and Rhode Island

General Laws § 9-1-28 broadly protect a person’s interest in “not having the
commercial value of one’s name, portrait or picture appropriated to the benefit of
another.” Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 400 N.E.2d 847, 850
(1980).

Plaintiffs allege that photographs of them were included with each

advertisement offering them for sale on Backpage.com, for which Backpage
charged a fee. Before the advertisements were posted, Backpage reviewed and
made the affirmative decision whether to display each photograph, and the use of
the approved photographs enhanced the effectiveness of these advertisements.
Rather than an incidental use, the photographs are integral to the Backpage
business model, and their use violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the applicable
statutes.
5.

Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 3 makes a plausible claim for damages and

injunctive relief for infringement of her registered, copyrighted photograph. As to
damages, the Complaint alleges that the display of photographs is “an integral
part” of Backpage’s business model, and that Backpage profited from its infringing
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use of Jane Doe No. 3’s copyrighted work. App.59-62. In addition, the claim
plainly warrants injunctive relief, a remedy explicitly available under the
Copyright Act. Absent an injunction, she has no recourse to prevent Backpage
from displaying or continuing to display her copyrighted photograph.
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ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the District Court’s construction and application

of the CDA. See Town of Johnston v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 765 F.3d 80, 83 (1st
Cir. 2014). This Court also reviews de novo the District Court’s decision to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011).
II.

SECTION 230(C) OF THE CDA DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS’
TRAFFICKING AND CHAPTER 93A CLAIMS
A.

Lycos Provides the Definitive Framework for Resolution of the
CDA Issues

This Court’s decision in Lycos provides the legal framework necessary to
resolve the CDA issues presented in this appeal. Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA
provides: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). As Lycos explained, this provision has
three discrete elements that a defendant must satisfy in order to demonstrate that it
is entitled to protection: “(1) [defendant] is a ‘provider or user of an interactive
computer service’; (2) the claim is based on ‘information provided by another
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information content provider’; and (3) the claim would treat [defendant] ‘as the
publisher or speaker’ of that information.”4 Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418.
Lycos involved state law securities and cyberstalking claims concerning
allegedly false information about the plaintiff company that was posted on an
online message board.

While the Lycos court addressed all three elements

necessary for a defendant to invoke Section 230(c)(1), the core issue there was
whether Lycos, an internet message-board operator, was responsible for the alleged
misinformation that third parties had posted. The court held that Lycos, an ISP,
was not responsible for the message board content that was entirely written and
posted by third parties, where there was not “even a colorable argument that any
misinformation was prompted by [the website’s] registration process or its link
structure.” 478 F.3d at 420. The claims rested solely on factual allegations that
sought to “imput[e]” the third-party message board speech to Lycos—“that is, on
treating [Lycos] as the publisher of that information.” Id. at 421-422. In other
words, the plaintiffs had failed to allege any conduct other than the message board

4

Though some courts have referred to Section 230(c)(1) as providing “immunity”
to ISPs, see, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 415, the statute merely provides an affirmative
defense, not immunity from suit itself. See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354,
1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining that Section 230(c)(1) is an affirmative defense
that can support a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal only where “the statute’s barrier to suit
is evident from the face of the complaint”); accord Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local
456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir.
2003).
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posters’ online speech that could support their claims. See id. at 422 (explaining
that there were no allegations in support of plaintiffs’ securities claim that Lycos
had taken a short position or engaged in “any … stock transactions” to profit from
the alleged misinformation posted on Lycos’s message board).
The CDA issue presented by this appeal is not whether Backpage is a
“publisher” of illegal commercial sex advertisements offering Plaintiffs for sale—it
surely is. Rather, the issue is whether Plaintiffs’ claims, as pled, “treat” Backpage
“as the publisher or speaker” of content provided by another, a required element of
Section 230(c)(1) that the District Court neglected even to examine. As explained
below, Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on allegations that, during the period before
the publication of the advertisements that held Plaintiffs out for sale for sex,
Backpage purposefully engaged in a systematic effort to solicit and encourage
child sex trafficking on Backpage.com. Thus, in contrast to Lycos, which involved
website features “standard” for online message boards, 478 F.3d at 420, Backpage
did not merely have notice of occasional illegal content on its site; rather, it
organized the website for the purpose of attracting and supporting illegal
transactions involving children, among others. App.26-45. As the Ninth Circuit
has stated, to preclude claims simply because “a website uses data initially
obtained from third parties would eviscerate [the statute].” Fair Hous. Council of
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San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir.
2008).
Before turning in Section II.C., infra, to a more complete treatment of the
reasons why their sex trafficking and Chapter 93A claims plainly do not “treat[]
[Backpage] as the publisher or speaker” of the various advertisements, Plaintiffs
first address in more detail the interpretation of the phrase “treat as the publisher or
speaker.”
B.

While

A Claim “Treats” a Defendant as a “Publisher or Speaker” Only
When the Claim Targets the Act or Process of Communicating
Third-Party Content
Section

230

defines

“[i]nteractive

computer

service”

and

“[i]nformation content provider,” see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-(3), it does not define
the phrase “treat as a publisher.” This Court must therefore give the words in the
provision their plain and ordinary meaning, guided by, inter alia, “dictionary
definitions, interpretations given to the same terms by judicial construction, and the
statutory context in which the words are used.” Hernández-Miranda v. Empresas
Díaz Massó, Inc., 651 F.3d 167, 171 (1st Cir. 2011).
The meaning of the word “publisher” is uncontroversial: “one that makes
public,” or “the reproducer of a work intended for public consumption.” Klayman
v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1837 (1981)). Likewise, the plain meaning of
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the word “treat” is straightforward: “to regard and deal with in a specified
manner—usually

used

with

as.”

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

DICTIONARY,

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/treat (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
There is, however, no dictionary definition for the phrase “treat as a publisher,”
and this Court must therefore consider the phrase’s “object and policy,” GozlonPeretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) (quoting Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)), as well as “its historical context,” United States
v. Yellin, 272 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir. 2001).
There is likewise no controversy about the background that led Congress to
enact Section 230. It did so “in response to a [New York] state-court decision,
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co. [1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995)],” which held that, because the interactive computer service Prodigy
sometimes “deleted … distasteful third-party postings” that appeared on Prodigyowned bulletin boards, Prodigy was subject to strict, common law “publisher’s
liability” for defamatory content that any one of its millions of users might choose
to post on any one of Prodigy’s numerous online bulletin boards.

FTC v.

Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2009). Congress was concerned
that, in an effort to avoid triggering such “publisher’s liability,” ISPs would
abandon any and all “efforts to sanitize content” that third parties might post on
their websites. Id. Section 230(c) resolved Congress’s concern by preempting,
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with respect to ISPs like Prodigy, the species of common law “publisher’s
liability” that the New York court had applied in Stratton Oakmont, thus enabling
ISPs to undertake good-faith efforts to regulate third-party content on their
websites without fear that doing so would trigger potential “publisher’s liability”
should some offensive content remain. See id.
Given this historical context, courts have accepted that the wording of
Section 230(c)(1) has its roots in the common law of defamation, which “treats as
publishers” those who participate, either intentionally or negligently, in the
communication of a defamatory matter to a person other than the person defamed.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 577, 581; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The term[] ‘publisher’ derive[s its] legal
significance from the context of defamation law.”); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359.
To be sure, federal courts have held that Section 230 is not limited to
defamation claims and “does more than just overrule Stratton Oakmont.”
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1195. Rather, in those instances where courts have
specifically interpreted the phrase “treat[] as the publisher or speaker of
information provided by another,” they have concluded that it bars claims that seek
to impose liability solely on the basis of a website operator’s “exercise of a
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone, or alter content,” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, which is conduct
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that “falls within the heartland meaning of ‘publisher,’” see Klayman, 753 F.3d at
1359 n*. To satisfy this test, the claim must either impute the allegedly harmful
content itself to the defendant, as did the claims in Lycos, or otherwise seek to
attach liability to the act or process of publishing the content.
Nothing in Section 230’s plain language or historical context remotely
suggests that Section 230(c)(1) was intended to provide a website operator like
Backpage with an absolute defense to a claim alleging that it engaged in
affirmative, deceptive, and injurious conduct, in violation of federal and state
criminal laws, in order to maximize its ability to profit from the unlawful
commercial sex trade. 5 Indeed, on the handful of occasions when a website
defendant has engaged in wrongful affirmative conduct distinct from the exercise
of traditional editorial functions with respect to third-party content, the Section
230(c)(1) defense has failed. In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
2009), for example, the Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 did not bar a plaintiff’s
5

One other federal district court case, also involving Backpage, has addressed the
application of the CDA to a sex trafficking claim brought under the TVPRA’s
private right of action provision. See M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC,
809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011). In M.A., however, the plaintiff—backed
only by a handful of bare-bones allegations in support of her TVPRA claim, see
First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13, M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 10-CV1740 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2010), ECF No. 23—argued that Backpage (1) should be
deemed the creator of the advertisements that trafficked her for sale and (2) was
not an ISP. The plaintiff did not argue that her TVPRA claim sought to hold
Backpage liable for conduct other than its exercise of traditional editorial functions.
See M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1044, 1048, 1050.
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promissory estoppel claim where the plaintiff alleged that a Yahoo! executive had
failed to fulfill her oral promise to remove the plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend’s posting of
fraudulent online profiles. The Barnes court reasoned that the promissory estoppel
claim sought to impose liability on Yahoo!’s breach of an enforceable promise—
and thus did not seek to hold Yahoo! liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party
content, but as a promisor who had breached. Id. at 1107 (describing the promise
as a “legally significant event” and the breach as behavior distinct from Yahoo!’s
conduct as a publisher); see also Xcentric Ventures, LLC v. Borodkin, No. 1315544, 2015 WL 5010674, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015) (per curiam).
Even in Lycos, where this Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Lycos
was not exercising “traditional editorial functions” when it made industry-standard,
content-neutral decisions with respect to the “construct and operation” of its online
bulletin boards, the plaintiff’s claims clearly sought to “impute” to Lycos a third
party’s defamatory bulletin board posting. Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-22. Both Lycos
and Barnes, therefore, confirm that Section 230(c)(1) insulates ISPs from liability
that depends solely on the ISP’s publication of third-party content—it does not
immunize an ISP’s own affirmative, non-publishing acts that otherwise run afoul
of the law.
In an effort to sidestep the language and historical context of the statute,
Backpage regaled the District Court with string cites of federal decisions
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dismissing claims pursuant to Section 230(c)(1). But in the cases that Backpage
relied upon, and indeed the vast bulk of decisions under Section 230, the plaintiffs’
claims were seeking to impose liability on the website operator for conduct that
“falls within the heartland meaning of ‘publisher.’” Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359
n*. For this reason, courts had little problem determining that those claims
“treated” the defendant as a publisher. Moreover, many such decisions actually
address (and reject) plaintiffs’ arguments for why the website defendant, though
having done nothing more than exercise traditional editorial functions, should,
under another prong of the statute, be deemed a co-creator of offensive postings
that indisputably originated with an unrelated third party. See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty
World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 409-10, 415 (6th Cir. 2014)
(addressing whether ISP developed content at issue in plaintiff’s defamation
claims); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir.
2003) (addressing whether ISP was an “information content provider” of
misinformation underlying plaintiff’s defamation and other state tort claims). As
explained further below, Plaintiffs’ sex trafficking and Chapter 93A claims here
are of a wholly different character from the claims in these cases relied upon by
Backpage.
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Plaintiffs’ Claims Do Not “Treat” Backpage as a “Publisher or
Speaker” of Particular Advertisements

The District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 230 fails to
comport with the plain meaning of the phrase “treat as a publisher” because the
claims do not impute the allegedly harmful content to the defendant or seek to
attach liability to the act or process of publishing the content. Rather, Plaintiffs
have plausibly alleged that Backpage engaged in an affirmative course of conduct
for the express, non-neutral purpose of creating a safe and hospitable online bazaar
for child sex trafficking. Plaintiffs’ claims seeking to hold Backpage liable for this
conduct simply are not aimed at traditional publishing or editorial functions.
Indeed, Backpage’s proposed interpretation of Section 230—adopted by the
District Court—would write the “treat as a publisher” element out of the statute
entirely. See J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, L.L.C., No. 90510-0, 2015 WL
5164599, at *3 (Wash. 2015) (en banc); id. at *8 (Wiggins, J. concurring). Under
Backpage’s interpretation, any website that engages in unlawful activity, but does
not create specific content, would automatically be immune from any civil suit.
The words of the statute say otherwise. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 12
(2004) (“[W]e must give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible.”).

36

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116894746

1.

Page: 47

Date Filed: 09/28/2015

Entry ID: 5940947

Plaintiffs’ Sex Trafficking Claims Are Based on Backpage’s
Independent Criminal Conduct.

Under Lycos, in determining whether Section 230(c)(1) bars a plaintiff’s
claim, a court is not to undertake a categorical approach, but rather must ascertain
whether the particular factual allegations on which the claim is based “would treat
the [defendant] as the publisher of a particular posting” created wholly by another
party. 478 F.3d at 422. As the statutory language and Barnes demonstrate, a cause
of action cannot be understood to “treat” the defendant “as a publisher” merely
because the defendant’s business involves some publishing functions.
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ claims under the TVPRA and the MATA do not “treat”
Backpage “as a publisher” at all, because none of these claims impute another’s
speech to Backpage. See Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422 (claim treated defendant as a
publisher because “any liability against [defendant] must be premised on imputing
to it the alleged misinformation” written by message board users). Plaintiffs do not
assert any claims that sound in defamation, or that resemble defamation despite
being asserted as a different cause of action. Nor do Plaintiffs’ TVPRA and
MATA claims seek to hold Backpage liable for posting the advertisements itself,
or for the act of communicating the advertisements. Compare, e.g., Zeran, 129
F.3d at 333 (under plaintiff’s claims, defendant would be “cast ... in the same
position as the party who originally posted the offensive messages”). Rather,
Plaintiffs are seeking to hold Backpage liable for its own affirmative conduct—
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conduct that ranged far beyond the “standard elements of web sites ‘with [both]
lawful and unlawful potential.’” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421 (quoting Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)); see J.S., 2015 WL
5164599, at *3 (explaining that Backpage’s policies, designed to enable sex
trafficking, are “not simply neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content”).
Separate from whatever publishing functions it might perform, Backpage
has a legal obligation to comply with criminal laws, including laws that prohibit it
from participating in child sex trafficking ventures. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102
(Section 230 only protects ISPs from liability where the “duty that the plaintiff
alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a
‘publisher or speaker’”). Under the TVPRA, anyone who knowingly “benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in [an underlying
child sex trafficking] venture” is criminally liable, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2), and the
statute authorizes victims of sex trafficking to sue any persons who “knowingly
benefit financially ... from participation in [the sex trafficking] venture ....” Id.
§ 1595.

This provision makes clear that one can be liable for unlawful

“participation” without being the individual perpetrator of the commercial sex
trafficking acts.6 Like the TVPRA, the MATA also has a private right of action

6

The Supreme Court has held that “participate” is a “term[] and concept[] of
breadth.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983); see also Negusie v.
Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 544 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that to
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that enables victims to sue “[a]ny business entity that knowingly aid[ed] or [was] a
joint venturer” in trafficking victims “for sexual servitude.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
265, § 50(d).
Here, Plaintiffs alleged that Backpage has intentionally created an online
market dedicated to illegal prostitution, including commercial sex involving
minors. App.14-18; cf. Dart, 2015 WL 5174008, at *12 (“[A] large percentage of
the ads in the adult services portion of the Backpage.com website are ...
prostitution ads … connected to human trafficking.”). Backpage has developed
this virtual haven for criminal sex transactions and participated in and aided sex
trafficking ventures through a calculated course of conduct, which includes: (1)
steering traffickers toward advertising language that will avoid law enforcement
scrutiny, App.39-40; (2) accepting non-traditional payment methods, including
Bitcoin, in order to make traffickers’ payments untraceable and the online
commercial sex market more attractive to traffickers and other predators, App.3435; (3) stripping metadata, including geolocation, from photographs uploaded to
the site with the intent to hinder law enforcement’s identification of child sex
traffickers, App.37-38; (4) intentionally removing law enforcement’s “sting”
advertisements in order to protect traffickers’ commercial sex market, App.32; (5)

“‘participate’ means simply ‘to take part’ or ‘to have a share, to take part in
something,’” a relatively low bar (citations omitted)).
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hosting private communications between traffickers and customers to facilitate
completion of transactions, App.36-37; and (6) feigning cooperation with victimprotection organizations and law enforcement while deliberately refusing to deploy
low-cost techniques, including computer algorithms, that could detect the sexual
exploitation of children with reasonable accuracy, App.28-29.
These allegations describe unusual and purposeful conduct that is very
different from the typical Section 230 case in which the ISP serves as a neutral
intermediary for the dissemination of content. See, e.g., Lycos, 278 F.3d at 415;
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 787-88 (8th Cir. 2010). Backpage was not merely
acting as a publisher when it knowingly operated and protected an online
marketplace for illegal transactions similar to those that produced federal criminal
convictions in U.S. v. Omuro, No. 3:14-cr-336(WHO) (N.D. Cal.), against the
owner of MyRedBook.com, a sex trafficking website remarkably similar to
Backpage.com, and in U.S. v. Ulrich, No. 14-cr-68(KBF) (S.D.N.Y.), against the
owner of Silkroad.com, a marketplace for illegal drugs and other contraband, see
U.S. v. Ulrich, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Accordingly, the
allegations supporting Plaintiffs’ sex trafficking claims, which neither target nor
rely on any specific communication or speech, do not treat Backpage as a publisher.
Indeed, these are exactly the types of allegations that the Washington
Supreme Court found that, if proved, would establish that Backpage was not
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entitled to a Section 230 defense under, inter alia, that state’s law against the
sexual exploitation of children. In an en banc decision, the court concluded that
Backpage’s alleged conduct of developing its content requirements in such a way
as to assist sex traffickers in evading law enforcement scrutiny would take
Backpage outside the protection of the CDA. J.S., 2015 WL 5164599, at *3. The
court also concluded that there were sufficient allegations that Backpage had
contributed to the creation of content to justify further discovery on that issue.7
J.S., 2015 WL 5164599, at *1. In his thoughtful concurring opinion, Justice
Wiggins recognized that the majority’s opinion correctly “implies that the
plaintiff’s [sex trafficking] claims do not treat Backpage.com as the publisher or
speaker of another’s information under the [CDA].”
concurring).

Id. at *4 (Wiggins, J.,

He then expounded on the publisher prong of Section 230,

concluding that claims alleging that Backpage had facilitated sex trafficking of
children did not treat the defendant as a publisher, and thus Section 230 did not
apply. See id. at *4. Justice Wiggins reasoned that assertions of broad immunity,
which find no support in the text of Section 230, should not be used to “defeat

7

Washington state courts do not apply the standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions
enunciated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See J.S., 2015
WL 5164599, at *2. Nonetheless, the court’s rulings of law are instructive here;
moreover, Plaintiffs in this case have alleged much more detailed factual
allegations than the plaintiffs in J.S. did, and as Plaintiffs argued in the District
Court, their factual allegations are more than sufficient to satisfy Twombly.
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potentially meritorious claims alleging flagrantly criminal complicity or
inducement by website hosts on the Internet.” Id. at *10. Here too, Plaintiffs’
claims describing Backpage’s meaningful participation in sex trafficking through
its online commercial marketplace plainly do not treat Backpage as a publisher or
speaker.
2.

The District Court’s Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A Claim
Pursuant to the CDA Was Based on a Fundamental
Misunderstanding of the Claim.

The District Court fundamentally mischaracterized Plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A
claim, asserting that the claim was based on the “‘deceptive’ design of Backpage”
and on an “entire website” theory. Add.25. In fact, the gravamen of Plaintiffs’
claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices is not website design, but the
misrepresentations that Backpage made to law enforcement and social service
organizations in order to deflect law enforcement and public attention from the sex
trafficking of children on its website. App.25-29, 57-58. While characterizing
itself as the “sheriff” of the Internet, Backpage falsely assured NCMEC and law
enforcement that it would, inter alia, be vigilant in attempting to detect trafficking
of minors, increase its reporting of suspicious advertisements, evaluate and adopt
both routine and advanced techniques to detect advertising of children, and be a
model of cooperation with law enforcement.

Id.

As a result of these

misrepresentations, Backpage induced NCMEC and others to make public
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statements supportive of Backpage, at a critical juncture—as Backpage
aggressively sought to secure its status as the dominant website in the online
commercial sex market, knowing that its success involved and benefited from the
sale of sex with children. App. 23, 26, 29.
In addressing similar unfair and deceptive business practice claims against
online providers, other courts have held that the CDA does not automatically shield
inquiry into the merits of claims that target misrepresentations to third parties. See
Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 13-cv-11701, 2014 WL 1214828,
at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2014); Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Panayotov, No. 12-cv12262, 2014 WL 949830, at *2-3 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 2014). In Moving & Storage,
the court concluded that “the plaintiffs do not seek to treat the defendants as the
publisher or speaker of the third-party reviews [posted on their website],” because
plaintiffs’ “cause[] of action [was] based not on [the defendants’] publishing
conduct but on [their] representations regarding such conduct, [which] would not
be immunized.” Id. at *2 (quoting Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., Nos. C-10-1321, C-10-2351,
2011 WL 5079526, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011)). In Small Justice, the court
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the Chapter 93A claim predicated on
defendant’s refusal to take down defamatory reports while simultaneously
advertising services by which the plaintiff could pay defendant to restore his
reputation.

2014 WL 1214828, at *9.
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suggested that the CDA would not bar claims alleging that an ISP had represented
its publishing conduct as neutral, although it was not.

Xcentric Ventures, 2015

WL 5010674, at *2.
Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations of unfair and deceptive practices center on
Backpage’s deceptive representations, conduct that is wholly separate from
Backpage’s publication of commercial sex advertisements. The District Court
misconstrued Plaintiffs’ Chapter 93A claim and, consequently, failed to recognize
that the allegations of that claim simply do not treat Backpage as the “publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
D.

Holding Backpage Subject to Plaintiffs’ Suit Avoids an
Unwarranted Federal Intrusion into State Law Matters

There is yet another critical element of the statutory interpretation exercise
which compels the Court to reject the expansive reading of Section 230 proposed
by Backpage and adopted by the District Court. Section 230 represents an instance
of express federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy Clause. While
Congress intended that Section 230 would sometimes override state law, Congress
did not intend to completely “occupy the field” of regulation of internet
communications. See Weaver’s Cove Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt.
Council, 589 F.3d 458, 472-73 (1st Cir. 2009) (summarizing distinction between
express, field, and conflict preemption). Rather, the preemptive effect of the CDA
is expressly limited in Section 230(e)(3) to “[s]tate or local law that is inconsistent
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In Massachusetts Association of Health Maintenance

Organizations v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1999), this Court held
that the determination whether a state law is “not inconsistent” with federal law
requires the application of established preemption principles, most notably the
“presumption against preemption” limiting the displacement of state law to those
instances in which Congress has unambiguously dictated that outcome. In the case
of Section 230, moreover, Lycos held that the extent of any inconsistency with
state law depends on the limits of the substantive provisions of Sections 230(c)(1)
and (c)(2). 478 F.3d at 418.
Where a disputed statutory term requires judicial interpretation to establish
its meaning—which plainly is the case for the phrase “treat[] as the publisher or
speaker” in Section 230(c)(1)—the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
presumption against preemption generally supports a “narrow reading” of the outer
limits of an express statutory preemption provision. Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518-20 (1992); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996). While most circuits, including this Court in Lycos, have concluded
that Section 230 should be “broadly” interpreted to protect neutral intermediaries
who may host harmful speech, 478 F.3d at 419, it is another matter altogether to
liberally extend the outer boundaries of the statute, as the District Court did, see
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Add.25 n.10, where Congress expressly limited its reach only to inconsistent state
laws.
Thus,

established

principles

of

federal

preemption

constrain

the

interpretation of Section 230 as applied to the MATA and Chapter 93A. In the
interests of common sense and consistent interpretation of the statute, the same
constraint should apply to the analysis of Section 230 as it relates to the federal
claim under the TVPRA. See O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir.
1996) (discussing importance of “practical, commonsense reading” of statutes).
E.

The District Court Should Have Permitted Discovery to Proceed
on Other Aspects of Plaintiffs’ Claims
1.

The Allegations That Backpage Contributes to the Creation of
Illegal Content Justify Discovery on the Issue.

Both Backpage and amici in the District Court presented arguments on the
content creation element of Section 230(c)(1). See, e.g., App.103-113. Though
Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that Backpage does contribute to the
development of the content in its “Escorts” section through active “coaching” of
advertisers and other conduct, Plaintiffs did not rely on this element of the statute
as a matter of law in opposing the motion to dismiss. Instead, Plaintiffs argued that
the content provider issue would require further factual development, and the
Court should consider the issue only after completion of discovery. App.236.
Choosing to address the merits of the issue anyway, the District Court concluded
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that Backpage’s conduct, as alleged, could not qualify it as a “content provider”
under the statute. Add.14-15.
But a more careful analysis by the Washington Supreme Court of the
allegations in J.S. reached the opposite conclusion. The court there held that the
allegations that Backpage intentionally induced illegal content that appeared on the
website would, if proved, demonstrate that Backpage was a content provider, and
thus were sufficient to justify proceeding with discovery before resolving the issue.
See 2015 WL 5164599, at *2-3.

The court explained that, “[v]iewing J.S.’s

allegations in the light most favorable to J.S., as we must at this stage, J.S. alleged
facts that, if proved true, would show that Backpage did more than simply maintain
neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content.” Id. at *3. In order to
determine whether Backpage acted as a content creator, it would be necessary to
“ascertain whether in fact Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex
trafficking,” and the court ordered the case to proceed to discovery on that question.
Id.
In this case, Plaintiffs allege far more specific facts than appeared in J.S.,
including that specific aspects of the website coached traffickers on various means
to avoid detection by law enforcement. Given, as noted supra n.4, that Section
230(c)(1) merely provides an affirmative defense, not immunity from suit itself,
the District Court should have addressed the content creation issue on a more
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complete record. The First Circuit has cautioned that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on
the basis of an affirmative defense is only appropriate where the facts gleaned from
the complaint “conclusively establish the affirmative defense.” In re Colonial
Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2003). Consistent with these
authorities, this Court should apply this principle here and permit Plaintiffs to
proceed to discovery on the content creation issue.
2.

Backpage’s Reliance on Its Own Self-Monitoring Justifies
Discovery Under Section 230(c)(2).

Consistent with Congress’s intent to avoid more cases like Stratton Oakmont,
see supra section II.B, Section 230(c)(2) provides that no ISP “shall be held liable
on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis added). Backpage asserted below, and the District
Court apparently agreed, that Section 230(c)(2) did not apply because that
provision can only be invoked by Backpage, and Backpage did not do so. Yet in
its arguments on Section 230(c)(1), Backpage touted its purportedly extensive
monitoring and filtering of proposed advertisements, the removal of suspect
advertisements, and its reporting to law enforcement, all of which Plaintiffs
contend to be a sham. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3-4, 6; App.205-206.
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These are, of course, exactly the types of actions that Section 230(c)(2) is meant to
address.8
The District Court erred in considering those assertions by Backpage under
Section 230(c)(1), thus permitting Backpage to avoid an inquiry into its good faith.
Such an approach renders Section 230(c)(2) superfluous. See Yates v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (“We resist a reading of [a federal statute] that
would render superfluous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the
same Act.”). As Justice Wiggins of the Washington Supreme Court ably explained:
The [CDA’s] actual defenses against civil liability are found in
subsection 230(c)(2). In other words, subsection 230(c)(1) is neither
an immunity nor a defense; it is a prohibition against considering the
provider as a publisher or speaker of content provided by another. ...
Backpage.com’s reading ... totally ignores subsection 230(c)(2); [it]
instead asserts that good faith is irrelevant to subsection 230(c)(1).
Whether or not that is correct, good faith is certainly relevant to
subsection 230(c)(2), which expressly requires “good faith.” We
cannot just ignore this subsection—we read statutes in context and
consider the statute’s placement within the entire statutory scheme. ...
[I]t would be absurd to ignore this language in order to protect the
8

Furthermore, the nature and extent of Backpage’s monitoring and filtering
practices are questions of fact, and on this topic, the District Court impermissibly
found facts and drew inferences in Backpage’s favor at the motion to dismiss stage.
Compare, e.g., Add.15 (finding that stripping metadata from photographs “is a
standard practice among Internet service providers”), with App. 37 (allegation that
Backpage “deliberately adjusted [its] server software, at additional expense, to
delete the metadata on each uploaded photo so that law enforcement cannot track
the photo”). In denying Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Backpage’s improper attempt
to dispute the factual allegations, App.182-85, the District Court stated, incorrectly
as it turned out, that the court would “only consider facts properly pled in the
complaint,” App.188.
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actions of Backpage.com, taken in bad faith, that have nothing to do
with publishing or speaking another’s content.
J.S., 2015 WL 5164599, at *6 (Wiggins, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Here, the District Court should have treated Backpage’s arguments as an
implicit invocation of Section 230(c)(2), recognized that Plaintiffs have made
extensive allegations of bad faith by Backpage, and permitted discovery to proceed
on that issue.
III.

THE TVPRA’S CIVIL PROVISIONS ARE PART OF THE
“ENFORCEMENT” SCHEME OF A FEDERAL CRIMINAL
STATUTE.
Even if Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claim fell under Section 230(c)—which it does

not—it should nonetheless survive dismissal under Section 230(e)(1), which
provides that the CDA shall not “be construed to impair the enforcement of ...
any ... Federal criminal statute.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1). Here, Plaintiffs bring suit
under a federal criminal statute, which provides a civil remedy as part of its
enforcement scheme.9
The “enforcement” of the criminal laws is not restricted to criminal
prosecutions by the state. Indeed, the definition of “enforcement” is any “act or
process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate, command, decree or

9

In Lycos, this Court “express[ed] no view on the appropriateness of applying
Section 230 immunity to a putative civil claim under 47 U.S.C. § 223,” one of the
provisions specifically exempted from the CDA’s scope by Section 230(e)(1). 478
F.3d at 421 n.4.
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agreement.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (9th ed. 2009). “Enforcement” can
often refer to suits pursuant to civil provisions that support and reinforce criminal
provisions of the same or related statutes.
For instance, civil RICO is part of the “enforcement” scheme of the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.
See, e.g., Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam) (“It is consistent with civil RICO’s purposes—to expand enforcement
beyond federal prosecutors with limited public resources—to turn victims ... into
prosecutors as private attorneys general ....” (emphasis added)); Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1089 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Civil RICO
deliberately created dual avenues of enforcement—private and public.”).

10

Accordingly, in Nieman v. Versuslaw, Inc., No. 12-3104, 2012 WL 3201931 (C.D.
Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), where a plaintiff sued a number of website operators for civil
RICO violations, the district court recognized that the CDA “arguably ... may not
be used to bar” a civil claim that a plaintiff brings under a criminal statute’s private
right of action provision, “because that would impair the enforcement of a Federal
criminal statute.” Id. at *9.

10

See also Gerald E. Lynch, How Useful Is Civil RICO in the Enforcement of
Criminal Law? 35 VILL. L. REV. 929, 929 (1990) (“Civil lawsuits of a particular
kind have been authorized, in part for the purpose of supplementing [criminal]
procedures.”).
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Likewise, civil antitrust actions are part of the “enforcement” scheme of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 344 (1979) (“These private [antitrust] suits provide a significant supplement
to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the
antitrust laws and deterring violations.”); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster
Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1969) (Clayton Act “enable[s] the private
antitrust litigant to contribute significantly to the antitrust enforcement efforts of
the Justice Department”). The same principle has been applied to civil remedies
for victims of child pornography. See Doe v. Peterson, No. 2:09–cv–13138, 2011
WL 1120172, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2011) (“[T]he Child Pornography
Protection Act of 1995 ... is clearly an extensively detailed legislative scheme
designed to police child pornography. One of the ways in which it discourages
child pornographers is by permitting civil actions against them.”).11
In short, these types of provisions enforce law-abiding behavior by
subjecting those who break the law to civil penalties established by criminal
statutes. If Congress had wanted to specify that Section 230(e)(1) only applied to
criminal “prosecutions,” it could have done so.
11

Indeed, Section 230(e)(1) expressly exempts from the CDA’s coverage the
enforcement of “chapter ... 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title
18,” which includes 18 U.S.C. § 2255, a private civil action for exploited children.
The similar civil remedy under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 was enacted after the CDA’s
passage.
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There are good reasons why Congress would choose to include an
enforcement mechanism in a criminal statute that is not subject to the restrictions
of a criminal prosecution. For instance, Congress might want offenders to be
directly accountable to their victims, particularly when the conduct at issue has
very serious consequences for those victims. It might want offenders to face
liability on a lower standard of proof than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It might
recognize that the resource constraints of prosecutors will inevitably leave some
criminal wrongs unredressed. But regardless of specific motivation, Congress
chose to include a civil enforcement provision in the TVPRA, and courts must
accordingly give that provision its full effect: “When Congress enacts a statute that
provides for both private and administrative enforcement actions, Congress
envisions a role for both types of enforcement. Otherwise, Congress would not
have provided for both.” Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 59 (1st Cir.
2006).
The cases on which the District Court relied plainly misread Section
230(e)(1) and its contextual implications. In Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006
WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006), the court concluded without any textual
justification that “enforcement” means only “governmental enforcement” and
grounded its decision on its view that categorical “immunity from all private civil
liability comports with the clear Congressional policies.” Id. at *3, *21. The Bates
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court’s upside-down approach to statutory interpretation, ignoring Section
230(e)(1)’s language in favor of the court’s apparent notion of “Congressional
policies,” is improper. Moreover, even taken on its own terms, the Bates court’s
reasoning cannot be squared with the rest of the statute, which shows that Congress
did not intend the CDA to provide websites with “immunity from all private civil
liability.” The decision in M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F.
Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), simply followed the Bates court’s errors. And in
Obado v. Magedson, No. 13-2382, 2014 WL 3778261 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014), none
of plaintiff’s claims were based on an alleged violation of federal criminal law, let
alone brought under a federal criminal statute’s private right of action provision.
See id. at *8.
It is clear that Section 1595 represents a part of the TVPRA’s enforcement
scheme. The civil remedy is located in title 18 of the U.S. Code. It supports and
reinforces the goals of the statute by holding offenders directly liable to their
victims and imposing on them additional monetary penalties above what they
would pay as a criminal fine. It provides a mechanism for holding an offender
liable even when the government does not have the resources to devote to a
particular case. Given the disturbing prevalence of child sex trafficking, the latter
is particularly salient in considering how the TVPRA was designed to function.
Read in the proper context, then, Section 230(e)(1) cannot be read to bar Plaintiffs’
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claims under the TVPRA. Adopting Backpage’s reading, as the District Court did,
would hinder enforcement of a federal criminal statute—the exact result that the
statute, by its plain language, attempted to prevent.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING NO CAUSAL
CONNECTION BETWEEN BACKPAGE’S UNFAIR AND
DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES AND PLAINTIFFS’ INJURIES
The District Court concluded in peremptory fashion that Plaintiffs’ Chapter

93A claim did not adequately plead causation because the claim was “too
speculative to fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of reasonably [sic]
foreseeability.” Add.25. Chapter 93A requires “a causal connection between the
deception and the loss,” i.e., actual causation, and “that the loss was foreseeable as
a result of the deception,” i.e., proximate causation. Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51,
71 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Casavant v.
Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 952 N.E.2d 908, 912 (2011)). An
actual examination of the raft of allegations here, which the District Court did not
undertake, shows that Plaintiffs plausibly pled both aspects of causation.
The factual cause inquiry considers whether defendant was a “but-for” cause
of a plaintiff’s injury. See Markarian v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 202 F.R.D. 60,
68 (D. Mass. 2001). In this case, Backpage portrayed itself to key stakeholders as
being committed to countering child sex trafficking on its site, which successfully
deflected public scrutiny of its business, and thereby allowed Backpage to grow the
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online sex market, and its dominant position in that market, with minimal
interference. App.26-29, 57-58. This expanded market ensnared the Plaintiffs,
who were repeatedly sold through Backpage.com’s commercial sex brokering
service. App.58. In other words, the market manipulation by Backpage increased
the risk of harm to Plaintiffs, who then were injured in fact.
At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, courts will rely on “[c]ommon economic sense”
to test the plausibility of causation pleadings in cases where market forces are the
media of injury. Boston Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769NMG, 2015 WL 314131, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2015) (rejecting argument that
plaintiffs “must negate all potential causes of loss other than those related to
[defendants’] activities” in order to allege causation); see also FTC v. Indiana
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 456 (1986) (finding that FTC may reasonably rely
on “common sense and economic theory”). In Chapter 93A cases, courts have
found “market effects” that have “an adverse economic impact on the plaintiffs” to
constitute factual causation, “however small and uncertain [those effects] may be.”
Katin v. Nat’l Real Estate Info. Servs., Inc., No. 07-10882-DPW, 2009 WL 929554,
at *7 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2009) (emphasis added). And while the District Court
summarily dismissed Plaintiffs’ theory as too speculative, Boston Cab
acknowledges that, while all claims “predicated on the independent decisions of
third parties; i.e., customers” are “to some extent speculative,” this fact does not
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preclude Chapter 93A liability. Boston Cab, 2015 WL 314131, at *4 (quoting Am.
Soc. of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ allegations that Backpage caused their injuries through
actions that had the effect of lowering the supply-side transaction costs involved in
sex trafficking online, which in turn increased the demand for and supply of
exploited children on the online market, is more than sufficient to plead factual
causation.
As to proximate cause, the question is whether the harm that Plaintiffs
experienced as a result of Backpage’s misrepresentations was reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant.12 See Smith, 732 F.3d at 71. When the risk of an
injurious criminal act “was not only foreseeable but was actually foreseen,”
proximate cause is established. Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 849 N.E.2d 829,
837 (2006) (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331,
337 (1983)). In Mullins, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to hold a
college liable for negligently failing to protect a student who was raped by an
intruder, on the basis that risks of criminal attacks on female college students were
12

Further, “proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be
solved by the exercise of good common sense in the consideration of the evidence
of each particular case.” See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 321 (5th ed.1984) (quotations and
citations omitted); see also Copithorne v. Framingham Union Hosp., 401 Mass.
860, 520 N.E.2d 139 (1988) (reversing summary judgment for defendant because
jury should decide whether rape of patient was foreseeable from reports of the
doctor’s previous sexual assaults).
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foreseeable.13 449 N.E.2d at 337. Here, Backpage not only ignored the risk to
children on its website, it took deliberate steps to ensure that prostitution would
flourish on Backpage.com and deflected public attention from the sale of children
for sex.

App.26-28.

Backpage even acknowledged that children are being

trafficked for sex on its website and has characterized such trafficking as a
“scourge.”

App.25.

Thus, it is beyond question that the injury to Plaintiffs

resulting from being sold and raped was foreseeable, because it was actually
anticipated by Backpage itself.
V.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THEIR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS
A.

Plaintiffs Have Plausibly Alleged Their Right of Publicity
Claims14

Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 214, § 3A and Rhode Island General
Laws § 9-1-28 broadly protect a person’s interest in “not having the commercial
value of one’s name, portrait or picture appropriated to the benefit of another.”
Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 400 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1980); see
also Leddy v. Narragansett Television LP, 843 A.2d 481, 490 (R.I. 2004) (“To
establish a statutory claim [under § 9-1-28] ... the plaintiff must demonstrate that
13

The District Court rejected Plaintiffs’ notice argument, but used case law
considering Section 230, rather than causation. Add. 26-28.
14
As intellectual property claims, the right of publicity claims are exempt from
Section 230 immunity. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2); 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:1 (2014) (“The right of publicity is ... properly
categorized as a form of intellectual property.”).
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the defendant commercially exploited him without his permission.”). The statutes
expressly prohibit the unauthorized use of another’s picture for “advertising
purposes or for the purposes of trade,” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A, or “for
commercial purposes,” R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28. Both statutes provide a private
action to “[a]ny person whose name, portrait or picture is used within” the relevant
jurisdiction “to prevent and restrain the use thereof” and to “recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A; R.I.
Gen. Laws § 9-1-28.
The District Court erroneously drew inferences in Backpage’s favor in
concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. In particular, the District
Court ignored Plaintiffs’ well-pled facts and instead made its own findings that
“Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants used their images to extract any direct
benefit… Rather, the allegation is that defendants benefitted incidentally ....”
Add.30. In fact, Plaintiffs pled the opposite.
The Complaint clearly states that Backpage used Plaintiffs’ photographs “to
enhance the effectiveness of advertisements” and that the photographs are “an
integral part of [Backpage’s] business model.” App.59 (emphasis added). Indeed,
this business model relies on tens of millions of dollars in revenue from ads placed
in the “Escorts” section—the only category for which Backpage charges a fee.
App.29-30.

Rather than an incidental use, Plaintiffs alleged that Backpage
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“make[s] an affirmative decision” to display each photograph only after reviewing
each one. App.59. It was error for the District Court to assume facts in the light
least favorable to the non-moving party.
The District Court also misconstrued the seminal Massachusetts case,
Tropeano, in evaluating the claims. Tropeano stands for the proposition that “the
crucial distinction under G.L. c. 214, s 3A, must be between situations in which the
defendant makes an incidental use of the plaintiff’s ... picture and those in which
the defendant uses the plaintiff’s ... picture deliberately to exploit its value for
advertising or trade purposes.”

400 N.E.2d at 850.

The District Court

fundamentally misunderstood the meaning of “incidental use” as defined in
Tropeano. In Tropeano, the image of the plaintiff was “merely one of several
people shown in an otherwise unrelated photograph used to illustrate” a magazine
article commenting on modern social mores. Id. at 848. Such publication was
“incidental” because it was a small, nonessential part of an article containing a
broader “sociological commentary, and not … a means of soliciting sales or in
association with an advertisement of any kind.” Id. at 851.
In sharp contrast to the use in Tropeano, Backpage deliberately used these
photographs as the centerpieces of commercial advertisements.

App.59-60.

Neither Tropeano nor the relevant statutes require, as the District Court implied,
Add.30, that the advertisements in which Plaintiffs appear must be directly
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advertising Backpage.com itself, rather than being posted on Backpage.com for
Backpage’s financial benefit. Thus, Tropeano presents no bar to Plaintiffs’ right of
publicity claims.
B.

Jane Doe No. 3 Has Plausibly Alleged Her Copyright
Infringement Claim

Only two elements must be pleaded to assert a claim of copyright
infringement: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of the protected
work. See, e.g., Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689
F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2012). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court tests the
sufficiency of the pleaded claim. See, e.g., Tracy v. Winfrey, 282 Fed. App’x 846,
847 (1st Cir. 2008). In dismissing Jane Doe No. 3’s claim, however, despite the
fact that both she and Backpage extensively briefed these issues, the District Court
did not offer any substantive analysis of the sufficiency of any of the theories of
copyright infringement—direct infringement, contributory infringement, or
vicarious liability.15 See Add.60-62; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 28-30; Pls.’
Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss 27-30. Notably, the District Court did not identify any
particular deficiencies in these elements of her claim. See Add.31-33 (addressing
only damages).

It was error to dismiss for failure to state a claim without

15

The District Court did not question, and Backpage did not challenge, that the
copyright claims are exempt from Section 230. Add.31-33.
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addressing the merits of that claim or the request for injunctive relief, and instead,
to focus exclusively—and prematurely—on monetary damages.
1.

The District Court Should Have Addressed Plaintiff’s Prayer
for Injunctive Relief.

The District Court incorrectly assumed that the “only recovery ... open to
Jane Doe No. 3” for her copyright infringement claim was “compensatory
damages,” and therefore concluded that “[b]ecause she does not plead any
redressable damages, [her] ... claim must ... be dismissed.” Add.33. However, the
Copyright Act allows for injunctive relief as well, providing that “[a]ny court
having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may ... grant temporary
and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502 (emphasis added). Indeed,
the Complaint sought “[s]uch injunctive relief as the Court deems appropriate.”
App.62. Nevertheless, the District Court ignored that request and never addressed
whether Jane Doe No. 3 was entitled to injunctive relief. Because the Copyright
Act permits injunctive relief, because Plaintiff requested that relief, and because
the District Court never considered that relief, it was error to dismiss Count V.
Jane Doe No. 3’s allegations state a claim for copyright infringement that
warrants injunctive relief. App.60-62. Absent an injunction, she cannot prevent
Backpage from displaying or continuing to display her registered, copyrighted
photograph, which (in the absence of discovery) she presumes they continue to
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maintain in their possession. Notwithstanding this concern, a plaintiff “has no
burden to prove likely repetition of the infringement to obtain an injunction.”
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06 (quoting Basic Fun, Inc. v. X-Concepts, LLC, 157
F. Supp. 2d 449, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2001)).
2.

The District Court Erroneously Assumed the Amount of Actual
Damages Without a Developed Factual Record.

The District Court erroneously and prematurely dismissed the allegations
that the display of photographs is “an integral part” of Backpage’s business model,
and that Backpage therefore profited from its infringing use of Jane Doe No. 3’s
copyrighted work. App.60-61. Plaintiff alleged that the “photographic images ...
enhance the effectiveness of advertisements placed on the website” and that
Backpage reaps “a financial benefit directly attributable to the public display of
such photographs” (including Jane Doe No. 3’s copyrighted photograph) by
collecting fees for advertisements that include these photographs. App.60-62.
As the non-movant, Jane Doe No. 3 was entitled to have her well-pleaded
facts accepted as true. Ocasio, 640 F.3d at 10-11. Instead of allowing the parties
to develop the factual record, the District Court erroneously made its own findings,
including that (1) there is “no plausible link” between the infringement and any
part of Backpage’s profits, and (2) there are no damages attributable to the use of
the photograph at issue. See Add.32. It based this conclusion on the understanding
that escort ads with photographs cost the same as those without photographs (and
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hence that Backpage could not have profited from the infringement), and the fact
that Jane Doe No. 3 did not allege loss of revenue or licensing fees as a result of
the infringement (and hence could not have suffered any monetary injury from the
infringement). Id. However, common sense dictates that Backpage profits from its
decision to allow sex traffickers to advertise their victims with indecent color
photographs, and the District Court moreover committed legal error when it chose
to ignore Plaintiffs’ well-pled allegations on this score and instead draw inferences
in Backpage’s favor. Furthermore, where, as here, a plaintiff has made a plausible
claim of actual damages, a district court cannot conclude on the basis of the
pleadings that the plaintiff in fact suffered no damages. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
Grant, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1401, 1411 (M.D. Ga. 2014); see also Steele v. Bongiovi,
784 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97 (D. Mass. 2011) (on a 12(b)(6) motion, “the Court may
look only to the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters of which judicial notice can
be taken”); NIMMER

ON

COPYRIGHT § 12.09 (“Courts should refuse to dismiss a

complaint based on apparent legal deficiencies, if discovery could validate its
allegations.”). Accordingly, the District Court should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court
reverse the judgment of the District Court.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-13870-RGS
JANE DOE NO. 1, a minor child,
by her parent and next friend MARY ROE;
JANE DOE NO. 2;
and JANE DOE NO. 3, a minor child,
by her parents and next friends SAM LOE AND SARA LOE
v.
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC, CAMARILLO HOLDINGS, LLC
(f/k/a VILLAGE VOICE MEDIA HOLDINGS, LLC),
and NEW TIMES MEDIA, LLC
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
May 15, 2015
STEARNS, D.J.
In this litigation, two important public policies collide head on – the
suppression of child sex trafficking and the promotion of a free and open
Internet. Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 (the
Doe plaintiffs) seek redress in the form of money damages from defendants
Backpage.com, LLC; Camarillo Holdings, LLC (f/k/a Village Voice Media
Holdings, LLC); and New Times Media, LLC. The Doe plaintiffs allege that
they were molested and repeatedly raped after being advertised as sexual
wares on defendants’ website, backpage.com (Backpage).
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contend that most of the Doe plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230, and that the
remaining intellectual property claims (unauthorized use of a person’s image
and copyright infringement) fail to state claims upon which relief may be
granted.
BACKGROUND1
Backpage is an online classifieds forum that groups goods and services
advertised for sale by geographic location and subject matter. At issue in this
case is the forum’s adult entertainment section and its subcategory offering
the services of “escorts.” The Doe plaintiffs allege that in the scungy world
of adult entertainment, this section of Backpage is a notorious haven for
promoters of the illicit sex trade, and even more troubling, the trafficking of
children for sex. The Doe plaintiffs contend that Backpage’s business model
depends in large part on the revenues it earns from its involvement in the
trafficking of children. To this end, Backpage is alleged to have structured
its adult entertainment section to lightly camouflage its illegal content to
divert the attention of law enforcement. In support, the Second Amended
Complaint (SAC) marshals the following facts:

On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded
facts of a complaint.
2
1
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● Backpage charges a fee for posting advertisements in the adult
entertainment section (and not in most other licit areas of the
website). The fee for the “adult” ads ranges from $12.00 to $17.00
per posting. Backpage charges an additional fee for each reposting
of an adult ad, and for featuring the ad (with a selection of text and
photos) prominently on the right side of the website.
● Backpage does not require posters in the adult entertainment
section to verify their identity. The website also does not require
that the poster use a registered credit card linked with a name and
address, and accepts anonymous payments in the form of prepaid
credit cards, or pseudo-currencies, such as Bitcoin.
● Backpage does not require a poster to verify the age of an “escort”
whose services are offered on the website. Although the website will
not accept an ad when the poster enters an age of less than 18, it will
permit the poster to immediately re-enter an assumed age.
● Backpage does not require any verification of the telephone
numbers posted in its adult entertainment section. It also permits
users to enter telephone numbers using any combination of
character strokes rather than in the more traceable (by law
enforcement) nominal numbers required in other sections of the
website (such as “twoO13fourFive678niNe” rather than “201-3456789”).
Backpage does not require posters in the adult
entertainment section to use their actual email addresses, but
provides an email forwarding service that protects a poster’s
anonymity.
● Backpage strips out metadata associated with photographs (such as
date, time, geolocation and other identifying information) before
publishing the photographs on its website. This prevents law
enforcement from effectively searching for repostings of the same
photograph.
● While Backpage bars the use of certain words and phrases through
its “automatic filtering” system, such as “barely legal,” “high
school,” “innocent,” “sex,” “blow job,” “hand job,” “schoolgirl,”
“teen”, and “teenage,” it readily permits the use of suggestive
3
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circumlocutions like “girl,” “young,” “underage,” and “fresh.” It also
does not filter out easily recognizable abbreviations of forbidden
words, such as “brly legal” or “high schl.”
The Doe plaintiffs further allege that defendants have waged a phony
war against sex traffickers to divert attention from their illegal activities.
While Backpage claims that its adult entertainment advertisements are
screened by trained moderators, it has refused to install readily available
technology that would far more accurately detect the trafficking of children.
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Backpage’s highly touted
claim to make regular referrals to the National Center of Missing & Exploited
Children has led to few instances of identification or rescue. Although
Backpage will on request remove an offending ad in the geographic location
in which it is posted, it does nothing to report or remove the identical ad
posted in other geographical areas, or other ads involving the same child.
The overall effect, the Doe plaintiffs contend, is to create a Potemkin-like
“façade of concern” that obscures the shady source of its filthy lucre. SAC ¶
34.
Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 aver that they have
been each personally harmed by defendants’ unsavory business practices.
Jane Doe No. 1 was first trafficked by pimps on Backpage after running away
from home in February of 2012, when she was 15 years old. She was again
4
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sold on Backpage in March of 2013, after she ran away a second time.
Between June of 2013 and September 10, 2013, her “services” were
advertised on Backpage each and every day. As a result of the ads, she
engaged in 10 to 12 sex transactions daily with adult men in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island. Her pimp moved her from town to town every two days
to avoid detection. Jane Doe No. 1 appeared on some 300 ads on Backpage
and was raped over 1,000 times.
Backpage listed each ad featuring Jane Doe No. 1 as an offer of “escort”
services, a common euphemism for prostitution. The Jane Doe No. 1 ads
included known signifiers for child prostitution such as “young,” “girl,”
“fresh,” “tiny,” “roses,” and “party.” Jane Doe No. 1’s pimp provided a
prepaid mobile phone and a prepaid credit card to conceal Jane Doe No. 1’s
identity when Jane Doe No. 1 placed ads on Backpage. When Jane Doe No.
1 attempted to enter her true age (which was under 18) during the purchase
of an ad, Backpage would instruct her to enter her age as 18 or older.
Photographs of Jane Doe No. 1 (with her facial features obscured, but at least
on one occasion displaying a unique tattoo) accompanied all of her ads.
Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked on Backpage by her pimp during various
periods between 2010 and 2012 at different locations in Massachusetts. She
first appeared on Backpage when she was 15 years old, after she had
5
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absconded from a residential program. Ads featuring Jane Doe No. 2 were
posted either by her pimp or an older woman who worked with him (his
“bottom”). The ads would appear on Backpage on average six times a day.
Jane Doe No. 2 was given a prepaid mobile phone to answer calls from
would-be customers generated by the Backpage ads. As a result of the ads,
she was coerced into 5-15 sex transactions every day. Like the ads of Jane
Doe No. 1, those of Jane Doe No. 2 featured her photograph. The ads were
placed using a prepaid credit card. Altogether, Jane Doe No. 2 was raped
over 900 times while in the thrall of her pimp.
Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Backpage in December of 2013 by her
pimp and one or more of his associates. The Backpage solicitations for the
underage Jane Doe No. 3 described her as “new,” “sweet,” and “playful.” As
with the other Jane Does, the ads were paid for with a prepaid credit card.
Jane Doe No. 3 was also given a mobile phone to take calls and texts from
customers. She was taken to a hotel in Foxborough, Massachusetts, where
she was raped by men who responded to the ads. Photos of Jane Doe No. 3,
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including one that she had taken of herself, appeared with the ads on
Backpage.2
The Doe plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in October of 2014. In their
Second Amended Complaint, they allege that defendants’ business practices
violate the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (Count I); the Massachusetts Anti-Human
Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
265, § 50 (Count II); and constitute unfair and deceptive business practices
under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
93A, § 9 (Count III). The Doe plaintiffs also bring claims for unauthorized
use of pictures of a person, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 214, § 3A and R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 9-1-28 (Count IV), and copyright infringement (specific to the photograph
taken by Jane Doe No. 3 of herself) (Count V).

In January of 2015,

defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The parties and several amici curiae3 filed helpful
briefs. The court heard oral argument on April 15, 2015.
At some point, Jane Doe No. 3’s parents became aware of the ads
featuring their daughter on Backpage and demanded that they be taken
down. A week later, the illicit ads still appeared on the website.
2

3 The City and County of San Francisco, the City of Atlanta, the City and

County of Denver, the City of Houston, the City of Philadelphia, and the City
of Portland (Oregon) (collectively the local government amici) and the
7
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DISCUSSION
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of
a complaint must “possess enough heft” to set forth “a plausible entitlement
to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 559 (2007); see also
Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 2008). As the Supreme
Court has emphasized, this standard “demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants rely primarily on the immunity provided by Congress in
enacting 47 U.S.C. § 230, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider,” id. §
230(c)(1), and the concomitant preemption of “cause[s] of action . . . brought

Commonwealth of Massachusetts submitted two amicus briefs in support of
plaintiffs. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy &
Technology, and Professor Eric Goldman (of Santa Clara University School
of Law) (collectively EFF) submitted an amicus brief in support of
defendants.
8
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. . . under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. §
230(e)(3).4 There is no dispute that defendants are, as the operators of
Backpage, providers of an interactive computer service. Defendants contend
that because the Doe plaintiffs allege they were harmed by the contents of
postings that defendants had no part in creating, the claims fall squarely
within Congress’s exemption of interactive computer service providers from
liability for third-party Internet content.
Congress enacted section 230 in 1996, while the Internet was still in its
infancy.

Congress explained the purposes of the law in five pertinent

findings:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent
an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens.

The Doe plaintiffs argue that the court should first assess the
plausibility and sufficiency of the factual allegations relevant to each claim
before reaching the immunity issue. However, the entitlement to immunity
under section 230 is not only an affirmative defense, but also the right to be
immune from being sued. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d
1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Section 230 “can [] support a motion to dismiss
if the statute’s barrier to suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”);
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (same).
As the Supreme Court counsels, a claim of entitlement to immunity should
be “resolv[ed] . . . at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
4
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(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even
greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for
intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.
47 U.S.C. § 230(a). Consistent with these findings, section 230 reflects the
“policy of the United States”
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other
interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization
of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to
restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate
online material; and

10
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(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.
Id. § 230(b).
The Doe plaintiffs argue that because the Internet has matured since
the enactment of section 230, the principal policy consideration that
animated Congress (promoting the growth of the Internet by insulating it
from regulatory restrictions and lawsuits) no longer has the assuasive force
that it may once have had. They cite the characterization of section 230’s
immunity guarantee as an affirmative defense in cases like Klayman and
Ricci as evidence that the courts have been whittling back the scope of section
230 immunity as the Internet has shed its training wheels. See Klayman,
753 F.3d at 1357; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28. The argument, however, does not
bear scrutiny. Both the Klayman and Ricci courts, whatever the label they
used to describe section 230’s effect, found the interactive computer service
providers at issue to be immune from any imputation of liability for thirdparty speech. Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-1359; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 27-28.
Moreover, Congress, far from lowering the immunity bar, ratcheted it up in

11
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2010 by expanding the scope of section 230 immunity to preempt the
enforcement of inconsistent foreign judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1).5
The local government amici attempt to repackage Backpage as an
“information content provider,” an entity that section 230 defines as “any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Their ultimate point is
that information content providers are excluded from the immunity granted
by section 230. The amici contend that Backpage generates content by: (1)
posting illegal materials in sponsored ads; (2) stripping metadata from
posted photos; (3) coaching the crafting of ads by allowing misspellings of
suggestive terms; and (4) designing the escorts section of the website in such
a way as to signal to readers that sex with children is sold here. The amici
argument relies heavily on Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, the Ninth
Section 4102(c)(1) reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or
enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the provider of an
interactive computer service, as defined in section 230 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) unless the domestic court
determines that the judgment would be consistent with section 230 if the
information that is the subject of such judgment had been provided in the
United States.”
5
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Circuit determined Roommates.com, a roommate matching service, to be an
“information content provider” shorn of section 230 immunity because it
elicited information about personal characteristics of users that is forbidden
by the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 1169-1170. The Court reasoned that
Roommate’s connection to the discriminatory filtering process is
direct and palpable: Roommate designed its search and email
systems to limit the listings available to subscribers based on sex,
sexual orientation and presence of children. Roommate selected
the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils allege that the act
of hiding certain listings is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing
Act, which prohibits brokers from steering clients in accordance
with discriminatory preferences.
Id.
To get to its result, the Court in Roommates attempted to draw a line
between active control of the content of a web posting and the provision of a
neutral interactive service that simply replicates offending third-party
matter.6
If an individual uses an ordinary search engine to query for a
“white roommate,” the search engine has not contributed to any
alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct; providing
neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches
does not amount to “development” for purposes of the immunity
exception. . . . Similarly, a housing website that allows users to
specify whether they will or will not receive emails by means of
user-defined criteria might help some users exclude email from
Roommates is one of the few sentinels denying section 230 immunity
left standing among some 300 cases (as of 2012) that have decided the issue.
See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 239 (2012).
13
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other users of a particular race or sex. However, that website
would be immune, so long as it does not require the use of
discriminatory criteria. A website operator who edits usercreated content – such as by correcting spelling, removing
obscenity or trimming for length – retains his immunity for any
illegality in the user-created content, provided that the edits are
unrelated to the illegality.
Id. at 1169 (bold emphasis added). This latter passage lays out the distinction
that afforded immunity to craigslist.com, an online classifieds forum that
also published discriminatory housing ads. “Nothing in the service craigslist
offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference
for discrimination; for example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to
people who include discriminatory statements in their postings.” Chicago
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519
F.3d 666, 671-672 (7th Cir. 2008).
Singly or in the aggregate, the allegedly sordid practices of Backpage
identified by amici amount to neither affirmative participation in an illegal
venture nor active web content creation. Nothing in the escorts section of
Backpage requires users to offer or search for commercial sex with children.
The existence of an escorts section in a classified ad service, whatever its
social merits, is not illegal. The creation of sponsored ads with excerpts
taken from the original posts reflects the illegality (or legality) of the original
posts and nothing more. Similarly, the automatic generation of navigational
14
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path names that identify the ads as falling within the “escorts” category is not
content creation. See Seldon v. Magedson, 2014 WL 1456316, at *5-6 (D.
Ariz. April 15, 2014). The stripping of metadata from photographs is a
standard practice among Internet service providers. Hosting anonymous
users and accepting payments from anonymous sources in Bitcoins,
peppercorns, or whatever, might have been made illegal by Congress, but it
was not.

Backpage’s passivity and imperfect filtering system may be

appropriate targets for criticism, but they do not transform Backpage into an
information content provider.
Although the Doe plaintiffs recognize that defendants did not author
the content of the offending ads, see Opp’n at 16 (“Plaintiffs’ trafficking
claims do not seek to ‘impute’ to [d]efendants any advertisements created by
others”), they challenge the breadth of the immunity sought by defendants.
Count I alleges a violation of a section of the TVPRA, a federal statute that
criminalizes sex trafficking. As the Doe plaintiffs note, section 230 expressly
states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or
any other Federal criminal statute.”

47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis

added). Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ business practices, “even if the
15
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advertisements had never been posted,” Opp’n at 16, are sufficient to make
out a violation of the TVPRA. Furthermore, according to the Doe plaintiffs,
section 230 only immunizes “action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The Doe plaintiffs argue that their
claims are of a different sort – they allege that defendants have intentionally
and in bad faith hidden behind ineffectual counter-trafficking measures to
deflect the scrutiny of law enforcement and social services agencies. Count
II alleges a violation of the MATA, the Massachusetts analog to the TVPRA.
The Doe plaintiffs argue that, because claims under the TVPRA are exempt
from the scope of section 230’s immunity, the claim under MATA does not
depend on “inconsistent state law” preempted by section 230. Count III,
which presses a claim of unfair and deceptive businesses practices under
Massachusetts law, is alleged to arise not from the posted ads and their
contents, but from the architecture of Backpage itself, which the Doe
plaintiffs contend is constructed to conceal illegal activity from law
enforcement. Finally, the Doe plaintiffs rely on Congress’s stricture that
section 230 “shall not be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
16
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intellectual property,” id. § 230(e)(2), as preserving the intellectual property
claims (unauthorized publicity and copyright infringement).7 I will examine
the viability of each count in turn.
Civil Remedy under the TVPRA
18 U.S.C. § 1595 provides victims of trafficking the right to bring a
private civil action for restitution against “whoever knowingly benefits,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture
which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in
violation of this chapter.”

The parties dispute whether a civil action

authorized by a criminal statute can be construed as “enforcement of . . . a
Federal criminal statute” exempt from the immunity provided by section
230(e)(1).8

Defendants do not rely on section 230 immunity with respect to the
copyright infringement claim, but contend, to be discussed infra, that it
should be dismissed on other grounds.
7

The Doe plaintiffs, citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
2009), also contend that their TVPRA claim falls outside of the protections
of section 230 immunity because section 1595 imposes a duty of care on
defendants wholly independent of their role as publishers of speech. In
Barnes, the Ninth Circuit barred a negligent undertaking claim under
Oregon law that sought to hold Yahoo liable for an alleged failure to remove
indecent profiles of a plaintiff that had been posted by her ex-boyfriend
because the claim attempted to impose publisher liability on Yahoo for
content created by a third party. Id. at 1102-1105 (“The word ‘undertaking,’
after all, is meaningless without the following verb. That is, one does not
17
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The

Doe

plaintiffs

maintain

that

the

statutory

language,

“enforce[ing] . . . a Federal criminal statute,” implies more than a
dependence on criminal prosecution alone. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014) (to “enforce” is “[t]o give force or effect to” or “[l]oosely, to compel
a person to pay damages for not complying with . . . .”). Further, plaintiffs
contend that civil actions are frequently authorized as part and parcel of the
enforcement regime behind criminal statutes. See Luka v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[C]ivil enforcement
mechanisms [] permit private parties to sue to enforce statutory

merely undertake; one undertakes to do something. And what is the
undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to perform with due care? The
removal of the indecent profiles that her former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s
website. But removing content is something publishers do, and to impose
liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable
party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.”).
The Court did, however, allow a claim of promissory estoppel to stand
on the allegation that a Director of Communications at Yahoo had contacted
plaintiff and promised to remove the offending ads, but failed to do so in a
timely manner. Id. at 1107-1109. “Contract liability here would come not
from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be
legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal of material
from publication.” Id. at 1107. There is no claim by the Doe plaintiffs that
any such assurance was given to them by Backpage. As Barnes illustrates,
the existence of a statutory remedy without more does not give rise mirabile
dictu to a tort duty. If it did, there would no need to create such a remedy in
the first place.
18
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prohibitions.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs also rely on dicta in Nieman v.
Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), surmising
that section 230 “arguably . . . may not be used to bar a civil RICO claim
because that would impair the enforcement of a Federal criminal statute.”
Defendants, for their part, point out that courts have consistently
rejected this argument in a section 230 immunity context. In Doe v. Bates,
2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006), the court held that Yahoo could
not be held civilly liable for allegedly knowingly hosting child pornography
on a user site styled as the Candyman e-group. The Magistrate Judge
examined “th[is] issue of first impression” in scholarly detail that is worth
quoting at length. Id., at *3.
The plain text of the statute establishes that the 230(e)(1)
exception does not encompass private civil claims. As argued by
Defendant, the common definition of the term “criminal,” as well
as its use in the context of Section 230(e)(1), specifically excludes
and is distinguished from civil claims. The term “criminal” is
defined as “[c]onnected with the administration of penal justice.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 302; see also American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 430 (4th ed. 2000) (defining
“criminal” as “[r]elating to the administration of penal law”).
The term “civil” is defined as follows: “[o]f or relating to private
rights and remedies that are sought by action or suit, as distinct
from criminal proceedings.” Black’s Law Dictionary 262
(emphasis added). In addition, Congress’ use of the word
“enforcement” in Section 230(e)(1) again confirms that the
exception refers to governmental action, not civil actions by a
private litigant.
19
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Congress did not bifurcate any statutes as asserted by Plaintiffs.
Rather, as noted by Defendant, it preserved the ability of law
enforcement officials to enforce the federal criminal laws to their
fullest extent while at the same time eliminating the ability of
private plaintiffs to pursue service-provider defendants. Given
the complexity of Title 18 and the availability of civil remedies in
statutes throughout the criminal code, Congress achieved its
intended result using simple language making it clear that
Section 230’s limits on civil liability would not affect
governmental enforcement of federal criminal laws.
As noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ invocation of Section 230(e)(1)
rests on their generalized policy arguments rather than the text
of the statute. Plaintiffs’ core argument appears to be that
Section 230(e)(1) must exempt civil claims under the child
pornography statutes because child pornography is “not to be
tolerated” and “[i]f the prospect of civil liability provides a
disincentive for engaging in child pornography over and above
that provided by the prospect of fines and jail time, then that is a
good thing.”
Child pornography obviously is intolerable, but civil immunity
for interactive service providers does not constitute “tolerance”
of child pornography any more than civil immunity from the
numerous other forms of harmful content that third parties may
create constitutes approval of that content. Section 230 does not
limit anyone’s ability to bring criminal or civil actions against the
actual wrongdoers, the individuals who actually create and
consume the child pornography. Here, both the neighbor [who
created the child pornography] and the moderator of the
Candyman web site have been prosecuted and are serving
sentences in federal prison. Further, the section 230(e)(1)
exemption permits law enforcement authorities to bring criminal
charges against even interactive service providers in the event
that they themselves actually violate federal criminal laws.
Regarding civil liability, however, Congress decided not to allow
private litigants to bring civil claims based on their own beliefs
that a service provider’s actions violated the criminal laws. As
20
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Defendant explained in its briefing, the reason is evident. If civil
liability were possible, the incentive to bring a civil claim for the
settlement value could be immense, even if a plaintiff’s claim was
without merit. Even if it ultimately prevailed, the service
provider would face intense public scrutiny and substantial
expense. Given the millions of communications that a service
provider such as Defendant enables, the service provider could
find itself a defendant in numerous such cases. Congress
determined that it wanted to eliminate the resulting
disincentives to the development of vibrant and diverse services
involving third-party communication, while maintaining the
ability of criminal prosecutions by the government for violations
of federal criminal law. In sum, Congress did intend to treat civil
and criminal claims differently and carefully crafted Section
230(e)(1) to achieve exactly that result. Plaintiffs’ claim, although
novel, is untenable and without merit.
Id., at *21-22.
The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s opinion, also noting
that
[t]he legislative history [] buttresses the Congressional policy
against civil liability for internet service providers. One key
proponent of an amendment containing the language of § 230 at
issue explained that “the existing legal system provides a massive
disincentive for the people who might best help us control the
Internet to do so.” 141 Cong. Rec. H8469. Several legislators
identified “obscenity” in particular as material that could be
more freely regulated as a result of the immunity provided by the
statute. Another proponent noted that “[t]here is no way that
any of [the internet service providers], like Prodigy, can take the
responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming
in to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin
board. . . . We are talking about . . . thousands of pages of
information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on
them is wrong.” Id. at H8471. The House approved the
amendment by a vote of 410 to 4. Id. at H8478.
21
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Id., at *4. The court concluded that on the basis of this legislative history,
“Congress decided not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based
on their own beliefs that a service provider’s actions violated the criminal
laws.” Id., at *5.
In M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp.
2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), the court adopted the reasoning of Bates and
rejected the identical argument from plaintiff, a victim of child sex
trafficking, that section 230 carved out an exemption for the civil claim that
she had brought against Backpage under 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Id. at 1055-1056.
Similarly, in Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014),
the court rejected plaintiff’s effort to claim private redress for defendants’
alleged criminal conspiracy to violate his rights. Id., at *8. “Even if Plaintiff
had alleged any facts to sustain this claim, the CDA exception for federal
criminal statutes applies to government prosecutions, not to civil private
rights of action under stat[utes] with criminal aspects.” Id.
Although the Doe plaintiffs challenge this line of cases as “flawed,” the
court is persuaded that criminal and civil actions differ in kind and that
section 230 exempts only criminal prosecutions.

Section 1595 itself

recognizes that although a private right of action may be complementary to
22
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government interests in combating trafficking, a civil action primarily
vindicates private interests and must take a back seat to a criminal
prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) (“Any civil action filed under this
section shall be stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out
of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.”). The court also
finds persuasive amici EFF’s argument that only criminal prosecutions are
exempted from section 230’s immunity because they are subject to the filter
of prosecutorial discretion and a heightened standard of proof, making them
less likely to have a chilling effect on the freedom of online speech.9
The Doe plaintiffs’ next argument, that section 230 only immunizes
“good faith” efforts to restrict access to offensive materials, has also failed to
find support in the decided cases.

Section 203(c)(1) states that “[n]o

provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” Section 230(c)(2) further provides that

Defendants also contend that plaintiffs fail to make out a case under
18 U.S.C. § 1595 because they do not allege that defendants shared the
traffickers’ criminal intent. Plaintiffs counter that section 1595 imposes
liability not only for aiding and abetting, but more broadly for “participation
in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in
an act in violation of this chapter.” Id. § 1595(a) (emphasis added). The court
need not decide this issue because it holds that this claim is preempted by
section 230 immunity.
23
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[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of –
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to
restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
Where section 230(c)(1) exempts an interactive service provider from
liability for publishing third-party content, section 230(c)(2) also immunizes
these providers from liability for actions taken in good faith to restrict
offensive content.
[Section] 230(c)(1) contains no explicit exception for
impermissible editorial motive, whereas § 230(c)(2) does
contain a “good faith” requirement for the immunity provided
therein. That § 230(c)(2) expressly provides for a good faith
element omitted from § 230(c)(1) indicates that Congress
intended not to import a subjective intent/good faith limitation
into § 230(c)(1). “[W]here Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Keene Corp.
v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 [] (1993). Accordingly, the
text of the two subsections of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)’s
immunity applies regardless of whether the publisher acts in
good faith.

24
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Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 5079526, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011), aff’d,
765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014).10
Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices
The Doe plaintiffs contend that the claim for unfair and deceptive
business practices under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Gen.
Laws ch. 93, § 9, survives section 230 immunity because it does not depend
on the content of the advertisements themselves, but rather on the
“deceptive” design of Backpage. Without the offending ads, however, no
nexus would exist between Backpage and the harms suffered by the Doe
plaintiffs. Their theory – that absent the permissive website design and
imperfect filtering, their pimps would not have trafficked them or, if they had
attempted to do so, law enforcement would have scrutinized Backpage more
closely and would possibly have intervened to prevent their injuries – is too
speculative to fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of reasonably
foreseeability.
Moreover, courts have repeatedly rejected this “entire website” theory
as inconsistent with the substance and policy of section 230. In Universal

Because the CDA immunizes Backpage from private litigants seeking
redress under civil law, the parallel state law claim under the MATA is
necessarily inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the CDA.
25
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Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007), the First
Circuit refused to hold Lycos (a search engine) liable for the “construct and
operation” of its website.

Id. at 422.

“Lycos’s decision not to reduce

misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial
decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a
particular posting. Section 230 immunity does not depend on the form that
decision takes.” Id.; see also StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. at 245 (rejecting
the “entire website” approach in determining whether the Internet ticket
marketplace may be held responsible for scalpers’ unfair or deceptive trade
practices); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d
250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding a “structure and design” approach
inapplicable where, unlike in Roommates, the design of website did not
“require[] users to input illegal content as a necessary condition of use.”).11
Also problematic is the suggestion that either knowledge or tacit
encouragement of illegal content (but not the content itself) can be the basis

Court have also rejected consumer protection claims under section
230(c)(1) that seek to hold interactive service providers liable for third-party
content. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-422 (Florida securities and
cyberstalking laws); Hinton v. Amazon.com, 2014 WL 6982628, at *1 (S.D.
Miss. Dec. 9, 2014) (Mississippi Consumer Protection Act); Obado, 2014 WL
3778261, at *1 (New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); Goddard v. Google, 2008
WL 5245490, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (California Unfair Competition
Law).
26
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for interactive web services liability. “It is, by now, well established that
notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to
make it the service provider’s own speech.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420; see also
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The simple fact
of notice surely cannot transform one from an original publisher to a
distributor in the eyes of the law.”). Moreover,
there is simply no authority for the proposition that [encouraging
the publication of defamatory content] makes the website
operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the ‘creation or
development’ of every post on the site. . . . Unless Congress
amends the [CDA], it is legally (although perhaps not ethically)
beside the point whether defendants refuse to remove the
material, or how they might use it to their advantage.
Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted, ellipsis in original). Indeed,
an encouragement test would inflate the meaning of
“development” to the point of eclipsing the immunity from
publisher-liability that Congress established. Many websites not
only allow but also actively invite and encourage users to post
particular types of content. Some of this content will be
unwelcome to others – e.g., unfavorable reviews of consumer
products and services, allegations of price gouging, complaints of
fraud on consumers, reports of bed bugs, collections of ceaseand-desist notices relating to online speech. And much of this
content is commented upon by the website operators who make
the forum available. Indeed, much of it is “adopted” by website
operators, gathered into reports, and republished online. Under
an encouragement test of development, these websites would
lose the immunity under the CDA and be subject to hecklers’
suits aimed at the publisher. Moreover, under the district court’s
27
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rule, courts would then have to decide what constitutes
“encouragement” in order to determine immunity under the
CDA – a concept that is certainly more difficult to define and
apply than the Ninth Circuit’s material contribution test. See
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. Congress envisioned an uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open internet, see § 230(a)(1)-(5), but the
muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud that vision.
Accordingly, other courts have declined to hold that websites
were not entitled to the immunity furnished by the CDA because
they selected and edited content for display, thereby encouraging
the posting of similar content.
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414-415 (6th
Cir. 2014).12
Right of Publicity
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A, provides that
[a]ny person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the
commonwealth for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without his written consent may bring a civil action in the
superior court against the person so using his name, portrait or
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may recover
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 provides in almost identical language that
[a]ny person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within the
state for commercial purposes without his or her written consent
Defendants also argue that the Chapter 93A claim, in so far as it is
based on alleged misrepresentations to law enforcement and social services
agencies, lacks an essential foundational element because law enforcement
and social services agencies have no connection in a commercial context to
defendants as “consumers” of goods and services.
12
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may bring an action in the superior court against the person so
using his or her name, portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain
the use thereof, and may recover damages for any injuries
sustained by reason of such use.
Accepting, dubitante, the Doe plaintiffs’ assertion that the right to publicity
constitutes an intellectual property claim exempt from immunity under
section 230,13 the court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs have not pled
Although certain publicity rights are akin to “intellectual property”
rights, a person’s image is not a “product of the human intellect.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). “[T]he right of publicity flows from the right
to privacy,” Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278
(D.P.R. 2001) (citing numerous cases), which is an intangible right of a
different nature. Despite the Doe plaintiffs’ attorney’s contention at oral
argument that a photograph may be copyrightable, it does not follow that the
underlying image is ipso facto protectable under intellectual property law.
See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264
(10th Cir. 2008) (“Recognizing that Oscar Wilde’s inimitable visage does not
belong, or ‘owe its origins’ to any photographer, the Supreme Court noted
that photographs may well sometimes lack originality and are thus not per
se copyrightable. . . . [P]hotographs are copyrightable, if only to the extent of
their original depiction of the subject. Wilde’s image is not copyrightable;
but to the extent a photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions
regarding pose, positioning, background, lighting, shading, and the like,
those elements can be said to ‘owe their origins’ to the photographer, making
the photograph copyrightable, at least to that extent.”), citing Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). Courts also disagree as
to whether state law intellectual property claims are exempted under section
230. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir.
2007) (“In the absence of a definition from Congress, we construe the term
“intellectual property” to mean ‘federal intellectual property.’”) with Doe v.
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008)
29
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plausible claims for unauthorized use of their images. Plaintiffs do not allege
that defendants used their images to extract any direct benefit (such as
featuring plaintiffs on advertisements for Backpage). Rather, the allegation
is that defendants benefitted incidentally from the fee charged for posting
advertisements with the Doe plaintiffs’ pictures in the escorts section of the
website.

The argument, however, has been explicitly rejected by the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.14
[T]the crucial distinction under G.L. c. 214, s 3A, must be
between situations in which the defendant makes an incidental
use of the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture and those in which
the defendant uses the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture
deliberately to exploit its value for advertising or trade purposes.
Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749 (1980). “‘The fact that the
defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a
newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to
make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness.’”

(“[Section] 230(e)(2) applies simply to ‘any law pertaining to intellectual
property,’ not just federal law.”).
“[A]s a federal court considering state law claims, we must apply the
state’s law on substantive issues and ‘we are bound by the teachings of the
state’s highest court.’” Phoung Luc v. Wyndham Mgmt. Corp., 496 F.3d 85,
88 (1st Cir. 2007), citing N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35,
37-38 (1st Cir. 2001).
14
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Id., quoting Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977) (in turn
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977)); see also
Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254 Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 62 F. Supp.
2d 483, 506 (D.R.I. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
remanded sub nom. Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int’l
Union AFL-CIO, 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The Rhode Island legislature
borrowed the Privacy Act’s scheme of four privacy torts, including the tort of
false light, from the doctrine of privacy torts promulgated by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 479
(D.R.I. 1999); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-E (establishing the
four privacy torts). Accordingly, Rhode Island courts have often turned to
the Restatement as an authority on the matter of privacy torts.”).
Copyright Infringement
Jane Doe No. 3 obtained a registration for her photograph on
December 18, 2014, after this lawsuit was filed. Although registration is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite of bringing a suit for copyright infringement,
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010), it is a “condition
precedent for obtaining certain remedies, such as statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees.” Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2005); see also
17 U.S.C § 412 (“[N]o award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . .
31
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shall be made for – (1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work
commenced before the effective date of its registration.”).
The only recovery remaining open to Jane Doe No. 3 is compensatory
damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504. Section 504 permits recovery of “the actual
damages suffered by [] her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages.” With respect to the latter, Jane
Doe No. 3 alleges that “[t]he Backpage Defendants derive a financial benefit
directly attributable to the public display of such photographs by virtue of
the payment of fees by the pimps and traffickers to Backpage.com.” SAC ¶
139.

However, she may only recover profits from defendants that are

causally linked to specific acts of infringement. See On Davis v. The Gap,
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159-161 (2d Cir. 2001). Here no plausible link exists
between defendants’ generalized profits and any common-law copyright
vesting in Jane Doe No. 3’s photo for the simple reason that the fee for
posting an ad is the same whether or not it includes a photograph. Jane Doe
No. 3 does not allege that she suffered any loss of revenues or licensing fees
for her photo as a result of the infringement (nor does she allege that the
protectable elements of the photo, see n.12 supra, have any market value).
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Because she does not plead any redressable damages, Jane Doe No. 3’s
copyright infringement claim must also be dismissed.
***
To avoid any misunderstanding, let me make it clear that the court is
not unsympathetic to the tragic plight described by Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe
No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3. Nor does it regard the sexual trafficking of
children as anything other than an abhorrent evil. Finally, the court is not
naïve – I am fully aware that sex traffickers and other purveyors of illegal
wares ranging from drugs to pornography exploit the vulnerabilities of the
Internet as a marketing tool. Whether one agrees with its stated policy or
not (a policy driven not simply by economic concerns, but also by
technological and constitutional considerations), Congress has made the
determination that the balance between suppression of trafficking and
freedom of expression should be struck in favor of the latter in so far as the
Internet is concerned. Putting aside the moral judgment that one might pass
on Backpage’s business practices, this court has no choice but to adhere to
the law that Congress has seen fit to enact.
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ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint is ALLOWED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment
accordingly and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
__________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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United States Code Annotated
Title 47. Telecommunications (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 5. Wire or Radio Communication (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. Common Carriers (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Common Carrier Regulation
47 U.S.C.A. § 230
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material
Effective: October 21, 1998
Currentness
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:

(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans
represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.

(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for
even greater control in the future as technology develops.

(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.

(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum
of government regulation.

(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.

(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States--

(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;

(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;

(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents
to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and

(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.

(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.

(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of--

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (1). 1

(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with a customer for the provision of
interactive computer service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control
protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that may assist the customer
in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with access to
information identifying, current providers of such protections.

(e) Effect on other laws

(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating
to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.
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(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.

(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.

(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or
any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.

(f) Definitions
As used in this section:

(1) Internet
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched
data networks.

(2) Interactive computer service
The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.

(3) Information content provider
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.

(4) Access software provider
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools
that do any one or more of the following:

(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or

(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.
CREDIT(S)
(June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II, § 230, as added Pub.L. 104-104, Title V, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 137; Pub.L. 105-277,
Div. C, Title XIV, § 1404(a), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-739.)

Notes of Decisions (89)

Footnotes
So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A)”.
1
47 U.S.C.A. § 230, 47 USCA § 230
Current through P.L. 114-49 approved 8-7-2015
End of Document
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United States Code Annotated
Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 77. Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in Persons (Refs & Annos)
18 U.S.C.A. § 1591
§ 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion
Effective: May 29, 2015
Currentness
(a) Whoever knowingly--

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a
person; or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act
described in violation of paragraph (1),
knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact,
that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be
caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is--

(1) if the offense was effected by means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or by
any combination of such means, or if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised,
patronized, or solicited had not attained the age of 14 years at the time of such offense, by a fine under this title and
imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15 or for life; or

(2) if the offense was not so effected, and the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised,
patronized, or solicited had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of such offense,
by a fine under this title and imprisonment for not less than 10 years or for life.

(c) In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained , maintained, patronized, or solicited, the Government need not
prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.

(d) Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned for a term not to exceed 20 years, or both.
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(e) In this section:

(1) The term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process” means the use or threatened use of a law or legal process,
whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to
exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.

(2) The term “coercion” means--

(A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person;

(B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious
harm to or physical restraint against any person; or

(C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process.

(3) The term “commercial sex act” means any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by
any person.

(4) The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or
reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the
same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual activity in order
to avoid incurring that harm.

(5) The term “venture” means any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 106-386, Div. A, § 112(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1487; amended Pub.L. 108-21, Title I, § 103(a)(3),
Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 653; Pub.L. 108-193, § 5(a), Dec. 19, 2003, 117 Stat. 2879; Pub.L. 109-248, Title II, § 208, July 27,
2006, 120 Stat. 615; Pub.L. 110-457, Title II, § 222(b)(5), Dec. 23, 2008, 122 Stat. 5069; Pub.L. 114-22, Title I, §§ 108(a),
118(b), May 29, 2015, 129 Stat. 238, 247.)

Notes of Decisions (51)
18 U.S.C.A. § 1591, 18 USCA § 1591
Current through P.L. 114-49 approved 8-7-2015
End of Document

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Add.41

2

Case:§ 15-1724
Document:
1595. Civil remedy,
18 USCA00116894746
§ 1595

Page: 122

Date Filed: 09/28/2015

Entry ID: 5940947

United States Code Annotated
Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 77. Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in Persons (Refs & Annos)
18 U.S.C.A. § 1595
§ 1595. Civil remedy
Effective: May 29, 2015
Currentness
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or
should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and
may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

(b)(1) Any civil action filed under this section shall be stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the
same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.

(2) In this subsection, a “criminal action” includes investigation and prosecution and is pending until final adjudication in the
trial court.

(c) No action may be maintained under this section unless it is commenced not later than the later of--

(1) 10 years after the cause of action arose; or

(2) 10 years after the victim reaches 18 years of age, if the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offense.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 108-193, § 4(a)(4)(A), Dec. 19, 2003, 117 Stat. 2878; amended Pub.L. 110-457, Title II, § 221(2), Dec. 23,
2008, 122 Stat. 5067; Pub.L. 114-22, Title I, § 120, May 29, 2015, 129 Stat. 247.)

Notes of Decisions (13)
18 U.S.C.A. § 1595, 18 USCA § 1595
Current through P.L. 114-49 approved 8-7-2015
End of Document
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Massachusetts General Laws Annotated
Part IV. Crimes, Punishments and Proceedings in Criminal Cases (Ch. 263-280)
Title I. Crimes and Punishments (Ch. 263-274)
Chapter 265. Crimes Against the Person (Refs & Annos)
M.G.L.A. 265 § 50
§ 50. Trafficking of persons for sexual servitude; trafficking of persons under 18 years for
sexual servitude; trafficking by business entities; penalties; tort actions brought by victims
Effective: February 19, 2012
Currentness
(a) Whoever knowingly: (i) subjects, or attempts to subject, or recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains by any
means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide or obtain by any means, another person to engage in commercial
sexual activity, a sexually-explicit performance or the production of unlawful pornography in violation of chapter 272, or causes
a person to engage in commercial sexual activity, a sexually-explicit performance or the production of unlawful pornography
in violation of said chapter 272; or (ii) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, as a result of a violation of clause
(i), shall be guilty of the crime of trafficking of persons for sexual servitude and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for not less than 5 years but not more than 20 years and by a fine of not more than $25,000. Such sentence shall not be
reduced to less than 5 years, or suspended, nor shall any person convicted under this section be eligible for probation, parole,
work release or furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence for good conduct until he shall have served 5 years of such
sentence. No prosecution commenced under this section shall be continued without a finding or placed on file.

(b) Whoever commits the crime of trafficking of persons for sexual servitude upon a person under 18 years of age shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years, but not less than 5 years. No person convicted
under this subsection shall be eligible for probation, parole, work release or furlough or receive any deduction from his sentence
for good conduct until he shall have served 5 years of such sentence.

(c) A business entity that commits trafficking of persons for sexual servitude shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$1,000,000.

(d) A victim of subsection (a) may bring an action in tort in the superior court in any county wherein a violation of subsection
(a) occurred, where the plaintiff resides or where the defendant resides or has a place of business. Any business entity that
knowingly aids or is a joint venturer in trafficking of persons for sexual servitude shall be civilly liable for an offense under
this section.

Credits
Added by St.2011, c. 178, § 23, eff. Feb. 19, 2012.

Notes of Decisions (1)
M.G.L.A. 265 § 50, MA ST 265 § 50
Current through Chapter 75 of the 2015 1st Annual Session
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Massachusetts General Laws Annotated
Part I. Administration of the Government (Ch. 1-182)
Title XV. Regulation of Trade (Ch. 93-110h)
Chapter 93A. Regulation of Business Practices for Consumers Protection (Refs & Annos)
M.G.L.A. 93A § 2
§ 2. Unfair practices; legislative intent; rules and regulations
Currentness
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful.

(b) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing paragraph (a) of this section in actions brought under sections four, nine
and eleven, the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to
section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.

(c) The attorney general may make rules and regulations interpreting the provisions of subsection 2(a) of this chapter. Such
rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and
the Federal Courts interpreting the provisions of 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (The Federal Trade Commission Act), as from time to
time amended.

Credits
Added by St.1967, c. 813, § 1. Amended by St.1978, c. 459, § 2.

Notes of Decisions (1256)
M.G.L.A. 93A § 2, MA ST 93A § 2
Current through Chapter 75 of the 2015 1st Annual Session
End of Document
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Massachusetts General Laws Annotated
Part I. Administration of the Government (Ch. 1-182)
Title XV. Regulation of Trade (Ch. 93-110h)
Chapter 93A. Regulation of Business Practices for Consumers Protection (Refs & Annos)
M.G.L.A. 93A § 9
§ 9. Civil actions and remedies; class action; demand for
relief; damages; costs; exhausting administrative remedies
Effective: August 9, 2004
Currentness
(1) Any person, other than a person entitled to bring action under section eleven of this chapter, who has been injured by another
person's use or employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two or any rule or regulation
issued thereunder or any person whose rights are affected by another person violating the provisions of clause (9) of section
three of chapter one hundred and seventy-six D may bring an action in the superior court, or in the housing court as provided
in section three of chapter one hundred and eighty-five C whether by way of original complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or
third party action, for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and proper.

(2) Any persons entitled to bring such action may, if the use or employment of the unfair or deceptive act or practice has caused
similar injury to numerous other persons similarly situated and if the court finds in a preliminary hearing that he adequately and
fairly represents such other persons, bring the action on behalf of himself and such other similarly injured and situated persons;
the court shall require that notice of such action be given to unnamed petitioners in the most effective practicable manner. Such
action shall not be dismissed, settled or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of any proposed dismissal,
settlement or compromise shall be given to all members of the class of petitioners in such manner as the court directs.

(3) At least thirty days prior to the filing of any such action, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably
describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be mailed or delivered to any
prospective respondent. Any person receiving such a demand for relief who, within thirty days of the mailing or delivery of
the demand for relief, makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any subsequent action,
file the written tender and an affidavit concerning its rejection and thereby limit any recovery to the relief tendered if the court
finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by the petitioner. In all other cases, if the
court finds for the petitioner, recovery shall be in the amount of actual damages or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater;
or up to three but not less than two times such amount if the court finds that the use or employment of the act or practice
was a willful or knowing violation of said section two or that the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith
with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated said section two. For the purposes of this
chapter, the amount of actual damages to be multiplied by the court shall be the amount of the judgment on all claims arising
out of the same and underlying transaction or occurrence, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage
available in payment of the claim. In addition, the court shall award such other equitable relief, including an injunction, as it
deems to be necessary and proper. The demand requirements of this paragraph shall not apply if the claim is asserted by way
of counterclaim or cross-claim, or if the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets
within the commonwealth, but such respondent may otherwise employ the provisions of this section by making a written offer
of relief and paying the rejected tender into court as soon as practicable after receiving notice of an action commenced under
this section. Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, if the court finds any method, act or practice unlawful with
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regard to any security or any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery as defined in section two, and if the court finds
for the petitioner, recovery shall be in the amount of actual damages.

(3A) A person may assert a claim under this section in a district court, whether by way of original complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party action, for money damages only. Said damages may include double or treble damages, attorneys' fees
and costs, as herein provided. The demand requirements and provision for tender of offer of settlement provided in paragraph
(3) shall also be applicable under this paragraph, except that no rights to equitable relief shall be created under this paragraph,
nor shall a person asserting a claim hereunder be able to assert any claim on behalf of other similarly injured and situated
persons as provided in paragraph (2).

(4) If the court finds in any action commenced hereunder that there has been a violation of section two, the petitioner shall,
in addition to other relief provided for by this section and irrespective of the amount in controversy, be awarded reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with said action; provided, however, the court shall deny recovery of attorney's
fees and costs which are incurred after the rejection of a reasonable written offer of settlement made within thirty days of the
mailing or delivery of the written demand for relief required by this section.

<[ There is no paragraph (5).]>
(6) Any person entitled to bring an action under this section shall not be required to initiate, pursue or exhaust any remedy
established by any regulation, administrative procedure, local, state or federal law or statute or the common law in order to
bring an action under this section or to obtain injunctive relief or recover damages or attorney's fees or costs or other relief as
provided in this section. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies shall not be a defense to any proceeding under this section,
except as provided in paragraph seven.

(7) The court may upon motion by the respondent before the time for answering and after a hearing suspend proceedings brought
under this section to permit the respondent to initiate action in which the petitioner shall be named a party before any appropriate
regulatory board or officer providing adjudicatory hearings to complainants if the respondent's evidence indicates that:

(a) there is a substantial likelihood that final action by the court favorable to the petitioner would require of the respondent
conduct or practices that would disrupt or be inconsistent with a regulatory scheme that regulates or covers the actions or
transactions complained of by the petitioner established and administered under law by any state or federal regulatory board or
officer acting under statutory authority of the commonwealth or of the United States; or

(b) that said regulatory board or officer has a substantial interest in reviewing said transactions or actions prior to judicial action
under this chapter and that the said regulatory board or officer has the power to provide substantially the relief sought by the
petitioner and the class, if any, which the petitioner represents, under this section.
Upon suspending proceedings under this section the court may enter any interlocutory or temporary orders it deems necessary
and proper pending final action by the regulatory board or officer and trial, if any, in the court, including issuance of injunctions,
certification of a class, and orders concerning the presentation of the matter to the regulatory board or officer. The court shall
issue appropriate interlocutory orders, decrees and injunctions to preserve the status quo between the parties pending final action
by the regulatory board or officer and trial and shall stay all proceedings in any court or before any regulatory board or officer in
which petitioner and respondent are necessarily involved. The court may issue further orders, injunctions or other relief while
the matter is before the regulatory board or officer and shall terminate the suspension and bring the matter forward for trial if it
finds (a) that proceedings before the regulatory board or officer are unreasonably delayed or otherwise unreasonably prejudicial
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to the interests of a party before the court, or (b) that the regulatory board or officer has not taken final action within six months
of the beginning of the order suspending proceedings under this chapter.

(8) Except as provided in section ten, recovering or failing to recover an award of damages or other relief in any administrative
or judicial proceeding, except proceedings authorized by this section, by any person entitled to bring an action under this section,
shall not constitute a bar to, or limitation upon relief authorized by this section.

Credits
Added by St.1969, c. 690. Amended by St.1970, c. 736, §§ 1, 2; St.1971, c. 241; St.1973, c. 939; St.1978, c. 478, §§ 45, 46;
St.1979, c. 72, § 1; St.1979, c. 406, §§ 1, 2; St.1986, c. 557, § 90; St.1987, c. 664, § 3; St.1989, c. 580, § 1; St.2004, c. 252,
§ 1, eff. Aug. 9, 2004.

Notes of Decisions (987)
M.G.L.A. 93A § 9, MA ST 93A § 9
Current through Chapter 75 of the 2015 1st Annual Session
End of Document
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§ 501 · Infringement of copyright 3

(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section
106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the
case may be. For purposes of this chapter (other than section 506), any reference
to copyright shall be deemed to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a).
"TVTFEJOUIJTTVCTFDUJPO UIFUFSNiBOZPOFwJODMVEFTBOZ4UBUF BOZJOTUSVNFOtality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a
State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the same
manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
(b) The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is
entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner
of it. The court may require such owner to serve written notice of the action
with a copy of the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the
Copyright Office or otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and
shall require that such notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely
to be affected by a decision in the case. The court may require the joinder, and
shall permit the intervention, of any person having or claiming an interest in
the copyright.
(c) For any secondary transmission by a cable system that embodies a performance or a display of a work which is actionable as an act of infringement under
subsection (c) of section 111, a television broadcast station holding a copyright
or other license to transmit or perform the same version of that work shall, for
purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be treated as a legal or beneficial owner
if such secondary transmission occurs within the local service area of that television station.
(d) For any secondary transmission by a cable system that is actionable as an
act of infringement pursuant to section 111(c)(3), the following shall also have
standing to sue: (i) the primary transmitter whose transmission has been altered
by the cable system; and (ii) any broadcast station within whose local service area
the secondary transmission occurs.
F 8JUISFTQFDUUPBOZTFDPOEBSZUSBOTNJTTJPOUIBUJTNBEFCZBTBUFMMJUFDBSrier of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission
and is actionable as an act of infringement under section 119(a)(5), a network station holding a copyright or other license to transmit or perform the same version
of that work shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be treated as a
legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs within the local
service area of that station.
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G  8JUISFTQFDUUPBOZTFDPOEBSZUSBOTNJTTJPOUIBUJTNBEFCZBTBUFMMJUF
carrier of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission and is actionable as an act of infringement under section 122, a television
broadcast station holding a copyright or other license to transmit or perform the
same version of that work shall, for purposes of subsection (b) of this section, be
treated as a legal or beneficial owner if such secondary transmission occurs within
the local market of that station.
(2) A television broadcast station may file a civil action against any satellite
carrier that has refused to carry television broadcast signals, as required under
TFDUJPO B  UPFOGPSDFUIBUUFMFWJTJPOCSPBEDBTUTUBUJPOTSJHIUTVOEFS
section 338(a) of the Communications Act of 1934.
§ 502 · Remedies for infringement: Injunctions

(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may,
subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.
(b) Any such injunction may be served anywhere in the United States on the
person enjoined; it shall be operative throughout the United States and shall be
enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United States court
having jurisdiction of that person. The clerk of the court granting the injunction
shall, when requested by any other court in which enforcement of the injunction
is sought, transmit promptly to the other court a certified copy of all the papers
JOUIFDBTFPOGJMFJOTVDIDMFSLTPGGJDF
§ 503 · Remedies for infringement:
Impounding and disposition of infringing articles4

(a)(1) At any time while an action under this title is pending,
the court may order the impounding, on such terms as it may deem
SFBTPOBCMF
(A) of all copies or phonorecords claimed to have been made or used in
violation of the exclusive right of the copyright owner;
# PGBMMQMBUFT NPMET NBUSJDFT NBTUFST UBQFT GJMNOFHBUJWFT PSPUIFS
articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced;
and
(C) of records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things
involved in any such violation, provided that any records seized under this
subparagraph shall be taken into the custody of the court.
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(2) For impoundments of records ordered under paragraph (1)(C), the court
shall enter an appropriate protective order with respect to discovery and use
of any records or information that has been impounded. The protective order
shall provide for appropriate procedures to ensure that confidential, private,
proprietary, or privileged information contained in such records is not improperly disclosed or used.
(3) The relevant provisions of paragraphs (2) through (11) of section 34(d)
of the Trademark Act (15 U.S.C. 1116(d)(2) through (11)) shall extend to any
impoundment of records ordered under paragraph (1)(C) that is based upon
an ex parte application, notwithstanding the provisions of rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Any references in paragraphs (2) through (11)
of section 34(d) of the Trademark Act to section 32 of such Act shall be read
as references to section 501 of this title, and references to use of a counterfeit
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or
services shall be read as references to infringement of a copyright.
(b) As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruction
or other reasonable disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been
NBEFPSVTFEJOWJPMBUJPOPGUIFDPQZSJHIUPXOFSTFYDMVTJWFSJHIUT BOEPGBMM
plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means
of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.
§ 504 · Remedies for infringement: Damages and proﬁts5

(a) In General.&YDFQUBTPUIFSXJTFQSPWJEFECZUIJTUJUMF BOJOGSJOHFSPG
DPQZSJHIUJTMJBCMFGPSFJUIFS
 UIFDPQZSJHIUPXOFSTBDUVBMEBNBHFTBOEBOZBEEJUJPOBMQSPGJUTPGUIF
infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).
(b) Actual Damages and Profits.The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and
any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not
UBLFOJOUPBDDPVOUJODPNQVUJOHUIFBDUVBMEBNBHFT*OFTUBCMJTIJOHUIFJOGSJOHFST
QSPGJUT UIFDPQZSJHIUPXOFSJTSFRVJSFEUPQSFTFOUQSPPGPOMZPGUIFJOGSJOHFSTHSPTT
revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and
the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.
(c) Statutory Damages.
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner
may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead
of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one
infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are li-

160

Copyright Law of the United States

Add.50

Entry ID: 5940947

Case: 15-1724

Document: 00116894746

Page: 131

Date Filed: 09/28/2015

§ 504

Copyright Infringement and Remedies

able jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000
as the court considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of
a compilation or derivative work constitute one work.
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and
the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
$150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion
may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. The
court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and
had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work
was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of
a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of
his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which
infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public
broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit
activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in section 118(f)) infringed by
performing a published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a transmission program embodying a performance of such a work.
(3) (A) In a case of infringement, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that
the infringement was committed willfully for purposes of determining relief
if the violator, or a person acting in concert with the violator, knowingly provided or knowingly caused to be provided materially false contact information
to a domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name
registration authority in registering, maintaining, or renewing a domain name
used in connection with the infringement.
# /PUIJOHJOUIJTQBSBHSBQIMJNJUTXIBUNBZCFDPOTJEFSFEXJMMGVMJOfringement under this subsection.
$ 'PSQVSQPTFTPGUIJTQBSBHSBQI UIFUFSNiEPNBJOOBNFwIBTUIFNFBOJOHHJWFOUIBUUFSNJOTFDUJPOPGUIF"DUFOUJUMFEi"O"DUUPQSPWJEFGPSUIF
registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the
provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes” apQSPWFE+VMZ  DPNNPOMZSFGFSSFEUPBTUIFi5SBEFNBSL"DUPGw
U.S.C. 1127).
(d) Additional Damages in Certain Cases.*OBOZDBTFJOXIJDIUIF
court finds that a defendant proprietor of an establishment who claims as a defense that its activities were exempt under section 110(5) did not have reasonable
grounds to believe that its use of a copyrighted work was exempt under such section, the plaintiff shall be entitled to, in addition to any award of damages under
this section, an additional award of two times the amount of the license fee that
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the proprietor of the establishment concerned should have paid the plaintiff for
such use during the preceding period of up to 3 years.
§ 505 · Remedies for infringement: Costs and attorney’s fees

In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award
BSFBTPOBCMFBUUPSOFZTGFFUPUIFQSFWBJMJOHQBSUZBTQBSUPGUIFDPTUT
§ 506 · Criminal offenses6

(a) Criminal Infringement.
(1) In general."OZQFSTPOXIPXJMMGVMMZJOGSJOHFTBDPQZSJHIUTIBMMCF
punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was
DPNNJUUFE
(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
# CZUIFSFQSPEVDUJPOPSEJTUSJCVUJPO JODMVEJOHCZFMFDUSPOJDNFBOT 
during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or
more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than
$1,000; or
(C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work
was intended for commercial distribution.
(2) Evidence.'PSQVSQPTFTPGUIJTTVCTFDUJPO FWJEFODFPGSFQSPEVDtion or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to
establish willful infringement of a copyright.
(3) Definition.*OUIJTTVCTFDUJPO UIFUFSNiXPSLCFJOHQSFQBSFEGPS
DPNNFSDJBMEJTUSJCVUJPOwNFBOT
(A) a computer program, a musical work, a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, or a sound recording, if, at the time of unauthorized
EJTUSJCVUJPO
(i) the copyright owner has a reasonable expectation of commercial distribution; and
(ii) the copies or phonorecords of the work have not been commercially distributed; or
# BNPUJPOQJDUVSF JG BUUIFUJNFPGVOBVUIPSJ[FEEJTUSJCVUJPO UIF
NPUJPOQJDUVSF
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Massachusetts General Laws Annotated
Part III. Courts, Judicial Officers and Proceedings in Civil Cases (Ch. 211-262)
Title I. Courts and Judicial Officers (Ch. 211-222)
Chapter 214. Equity Jurisdiction (Refs & Annos)
M.G.L.A. 214 § 3A
§ 3A. Unauthorized use of name, portrait or picture of a person; injunctive relief; damages; exceptions
Currentness
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the commonwealth for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without his written consent may bring a civil action in the superior court against the person so using his name, portrait or
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use. If
the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in such manner as is prohibited or unlawful,
the court, in its discretion, may award the plaintiff treble the amount of the damages sustained by him. Nothing in this section
shall be so construed as to prevent any person practicing the profession of photography from exhibiting in or about his or its
establishment specimens of the work of such person or establishment, unless the exhibiting of any such specimen is continued
after written notice objecting thereto has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing in this section shall be so construed as
to prevent any person from using the name, portrait or picture of any manufacturer or dealer in connection with the goods, wares
and merchandise manufactured, produced or dealt in by such manufacturer or dealer which such person has sold or disposed
of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith; or from using the name, portrait or picture of any author,
composer or artist in connection with any literary, musical or artistic production of such author, composer or artist which such
person has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith.

Credits
Added by St.1973, c. 1114, § 62.

Notes of Decisions (18)
M.G.L.A. 214 § 3A, MA ST 214 § 3A
Current through Chapter 75 of the 2015 1st Annual Session
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TITLE 9
Courts and Civil Procedure–Procedure
Generally
CHAPTER 91
Causes of Action
SECTION 9128

§ 9128 Action for unauthorized use of name, portrait, or picture. – (a) Any person whose name,
portrait, or picture is used within the state for commercial purposes without his or her written consent
may bring an action in the superior court against the person so using his or her name, portrait, or picture
to prevent and restrain the use thereof, and may recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of
such use. If the defendant shall have knowingly used the person's name, portrait, or picture in such
manner as is prohibited or unlawful, the court, in its discretion, may award the plaintiff treble the amount
of the damages sustained by him or her.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be so construed as to:
(1) Apply to the use of names, portraits, or pictures in political speech or on matters of public concern;
(2) Prevent any person practicing the profession of photography from exhibiting in or about his or her
or its establishment specimens of the work of the person or establishment, unless the exhibiting of any
such specimen is continued after written notice objecting to it has been given by the person portrayed; or
(3) Prevent any person from using the name, portrait, or picture of any manufacturer or dealer in
connection with the goods, wares, and merchandise manufactured, produced, or dealt in by the
manufacturer or dealer which the person has sold or disposed of with the name, portrait, or picture used
in connection therewith, or from using the name, portrait, or picture of any author, composer, or artist in
connection with any literary, musical, or artistic production of the author, composer, or artist which the
person has sold or disposed of with the name, portrait, or picture used in connection therewith.
History of Section.
(P.L. 1972, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 366, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 384, § 1.)
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